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. Introduction
Imagine that you are suffering from pneumonia and need an injection
of a contrast medium prior to chest X-rays to examine your lungs. Imagine
further that you have a choice between two physicians to perform the
procedure. Physician A bases her performance of medical procedures on
the accepted practices of the medical community and her personal
experience. Thus, she relies on knowledge that she acquired years ago in
medical school and what she has learned from her colleagues and through
clinical experience. She will inject the contrast medium into your chest in
accordance with traditional practice. Physician B also considers accepted
practices and personal experience but additionally considers high-grade
scientific evidence. She makes her decisions by integrating the best
research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. As such, she
has read several studies cautioning against injection of contrast medium
into the chest of patients with your physical characteristics because of a
high risk of complications. She prefers an alternate site with proven
efficacy and no safety risks. Do you have any doubt about which physician
to choose?
480
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN THE LAW BEYOND CPGS 481
This simple hypothetical scenario' introduces the difference between
traditional eminence- or opinion-based medical practice 2 and evidence-
based medicine (EBM), 3 and suggests the desirability of the latter. EBM is
"the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in
making decisions about the care of individual patients., 4 EBM seeks to shift
the focus of physician decisionmaking from experience and opinion to a more
stringent review and application of high-grade scientific evidence garnered
from randomized clinical trials (RCTs) and observational studies.'
1. This hypothetical scenario draws on the case Brook v. St. John's Hickey Memorial
Hospital, 380 N.E.2d 72, 72 (Ind. 1978) (holding that radiologist was not negligent in choosing
calf muscles as injection site for contrast medium instead of more common sites such as gluteal
muscles or thighs). In Brook, the Supreme Court of Indiana considered an action alleging
medical malpractice arising out of an injection of contrast medium into the two-year-old
plaintiff's calf. Id. Prior to the events giving rise to the case, a specialist diagnosed Tracy
Brook with a possible urological disorder. Id. at 73. In order to confirm the diagnosis, a
radiologist had to inject Brook with a contrast medium and take X-rays. Id. The radiologist
selected the patient's calves as the injection site instead of the gluteal muscles as the medium's
manufacturer recommended. Id. at 74. Four months later, Brook experienced shortening of the
achilles tendon, which calf trauma may have caused. Id. The radiologist defended his choice of
the calves on the grounds that he had read warnings against injecting contrast medium into the
gluteal muscles and thighs of young children, that he had previously used the calves as an
injection site with no complications, and that he had not seen any evidence cautioning against
use of the calves. Id. at 77. The Brook court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
exonerating the radiologist. Id.
2. See John M. Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be
Reconciled?, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 369, 370 (2001 ) (contrasting practice of opinion-
based medicine from practice of evidence-based medicine); Dan Mayer, Evidence-Based
Medicine, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 601,601 (2002) (defining eminence-based medicine). Mayer
explains:
In the past, medicine was based on what a bunch of gray-haired experts believed
and, since now I have gray hair, I can count myself among them. Basically, based
on what "we" said medicine should be, "we" determined how medical practice
should occur. I call this "Eminence-Based Medicine."
Id.
3. Scholars also refer to evidence-based medicine as evidence-based practice (EBP). See
INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
147 (2001) (using terms evidence-based medicine and evidence-based practice interchangeably);
Alan Pearson, Nursing Takes the Lead. Redefining What Counts As Evidence in Australian
Healthcare, REFLECTIONS ON NURSING LEADERsHm, Fourth Quarter 2002, at 18, 18 (discussing
evidence-based practice in nursing in Australia).
4. David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn 't, 312
BRIT. MED. J. 71,71 (1996).
5. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 369 ("Physicians have been encouraged to practice
'evidence-based medicine,' so that their clinical decisions would be based upon a foundation of
solid science, especially using research that has applied rigorous epidemiologic methods, and
has been published in peer-reviewed journals."); Lucian L. Leape et al., What Practices Will
Most Improve Safety?, 288 JAMA 501, 501 (2002) ("Advocates of evidence-based medicine
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The role of science in medicine has increased dramatically in recent
decades.6 The increased prominence of science has improved health care by
showing that many widely accepted medical practices are not only ineffective
but, in some cases, injurious.7 Yet today, much of modem medicine remains
unsupported by scientific evidence.8 EBM "arose from the realization that
health care interventions, no matter how commonsense or physiologically
sound, often lack benefit and sometimes even cause harm." 9 In the absence of
evidence of the efficacy of many treatments, physicians traditionally follow the
pattern of Physician A, relying on anecdotal experience and knowledge
acquired from mentors or peers to guide their practice.' 0 EBM encourages
physicians to follow the paradigm of Physician B.
Indicators suggest that the EBM movement has altered medicine. For
example, many medical schools have started teaching EBM. " In addition, one
study suggests that the number of physicians practicing EBM has increased.
12
One scholar underscores the importance of the EBM movement by declaring it
(EBM) argue that medical decisions should be based, as much as possible, on a firm foundation
of high-grade scientific evidence, rather than on experience or opinion.").
6. See Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A
Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1483, 1487-88
(1989) (considering dramatic increase in role of science in medical care in recent decades).
7. See Leape et al., supra note 5, at 501 ("In the past, many experience-based and
opinion-based practices have proved to be ineffective or even harmful.").
8. See id. (noting questionable value of many widely used practices due to lack of
supporting evidence); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws
and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1701, 1774 (1999) ("[O]nly a small percentage
of medical therapies have been scientifically proven.").
9. Kaveh G. Shojania et al., Safe But Sound: Patient Safety Meets Evidence-Based
Medicine, 288 JAMA 508, 508 (2002); see also Leape et al., supra note 5, at 506 (referring to
use of lidocaine after myocardial infarction as one of several medical practices physicians
discarded after rigorous studies established its ineffectiveness (citing Antman J. Lau et al.,
Cumulative Meta-Analysis of Therapeutic Trials for Myocardial Infarction, 327 N. ENG. J.
MED. 248, 248-54 (1992))).
10. See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 382 (2002) (recognizing
physicians' traditional reliance on personal experience and anecdotal information).
I1. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 370 (pointing to shift in culture of medical education
toward constructing evidence base for medical practice built on science); Rose Hatala & Gordon
Guyatt, Evaluating the Teaching of Evidence-Based Medicine, 288 JAMA 1110, 1110 (2002)
(noting that increasing number of medical schools and residency programs are formulating
curricula to teach principles and practice of EBM).
12. See Hatala & Guyatt, supra note 11, at I I 1 (citing increase in number of EBM
practitioners).
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a "paradigm shift" in medical practice.' 3 Another boldly asserts that EBM is
the most important advance in medicine in the last one-hundred years. 4
Yet despite these potentially profound impacts of EBM on the practice of
medicine, it is unclear how EBM will alter the law. So far, the legal
community has not fully addressed this question because the primary legal
response to the EBM movement has focused on clinical practice guidelines
(CPGs).' 5 CPGs are "systematically developed statements to assist practitioner
and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances.' 6 This Note argues that the legal response to EBM must go
beyond CPGs.17  First, the legal community must consider whether the
traditional custom-based standard of care that courts use to determine liability
in medical malpractice cases can co-exist with the shift in the medical
community from practicing according to experience or opinion to practicing
according to high-grade scientific evidence. The move from traditional practice
to EBM is essentially a move from a custom-based approach to an evidence-
based approach.' 8 Characterizing the shift this way underscores the potential
incompatibility of legal and medical standards. But if the custom-based
standard is insufficient, what should take its place? The answer will have
significant implications for medical malpractice law.' 9 In addition, by paying
closer attention to EBM, the legal community may provide society with
multiple benefits, including easier resolution of medical malpractice litigation
13. Noah, supra note 10, at 374.
14. See Janet M. Torpy, New Threats and Old Enemies: Challenges for Critical Care
Medicine, 287 JAMA 1513, 1514 (2002) (citing EBM as most important advance in modem
medicine). Torpy quotes from Dennis Maki, MD, speaking at the USC School of Medicine's
40th Anniversary Symposium on Medical Care as follows:
The most important advance in medicine in the last 100 years is not antisepsis, or
germ theory, vaccines, or treatment of the shock state. It is the buzzword of the
20th century, evidence-based medicine. Increasingly, everything we do has an
underpinning of research; maybe it doesn't give us all the answers, maybe it gives
controversy, but it gives us guidance.
Id.
15. Scholars also refer to CPGs as practice parameters or clinical pathways. See BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 179 (4th ed. 200 1) (noting
alternate terms for CPGs).
16. INST. OF MED., GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO USE 27
(Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 15, at
179 (defining guidelines further as "standardized specifications for using a procedure or
managing a particular clinical problem").
17. See infra Part II (distinguishing CPGs from EBM).
18. See infra Part III.A (explaining EBM's shift away from reliance on custom).
19. See Noah, supra note 10, at 377 ("The debate over [EBM] may have important
lessons for a variety of legal issues involving medical practice and technology.").
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and increased production of biomedical research.2" As one scholar states,
"[H]ow the law regards and treats EBM will... greatly affect the pace and
nature of its acceptance."2'
This Note acknowledges that it is premature to consider imposing a duty to
practice EBM but contends that courts should consider whether their current
standard of care analysis is compatible with EBM. The potential
incompatibility is double-edged. On the one hand, a custom-based standard of
care may have a chilling effect on the practice of EBM, as physicians fear the
threat of liability for deviating from consensus-based practices. On the other
hand, courts have articulated a duty for physicians to stay abreast of the latest
medical science, yet it is unclear how courts will construe this duty in light of
EBM. Without clarification, this duty might engender fear of liability for not
practicing EBM.
This Note considers potential inconsistencies between EBM and current
standard of care analysis and suggests frameworks for altering the standard of
care in light of EBM. Part H distinguishes CPGs from EBM.22 This Note
argues that EBM and CPGs are distinguishable in most, if not all, contexts, and
therefore the legal response to EBM must go beyond CPGs.23 Part II.A
provides a brief overview of the rise of CPGs and presents the views of both
proponents and opponents of CPGs.24 Part H.B provides a similar analysis of
EBM. 21 Part fI.C considers the current, limited legal response to EBM, which
fails to acknowledge the import of EBM beyond CPGs.26 Part III explains the
potential incompatibility of current standard of care analysis and EBM. 27 It
distinguishes EBM's movement away from reliance on custom as a measure of
20. See id. at 378 (explaining benefits to be gained by paying closer attention to EBM).
Noah asserts that:
Greater attention to the insights of EBM may facilitate the resolution of tort
litigation involving medical technologies and medical practice. In turn, the courts
may help to encourage the production of biomedical research and perhaps also
persuade physicians to align their practice patterns more closely with the ideals of
evidence-based medicine.
Id.
21. Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 327, 330 (2001).
22. See infra Part II (distinguishing CPGs from EBM).
23. See infra Part II (distinguishing CPGs from EBM).
24. See infra Part IL.A (discussing rise of CPGs and presenting opposing views thereof).
25. See infra Part ll.B (discussing rise of EBM and presenting opposing views thereof).
26. See infra Part II.C (considering limited legal response to EBM).
27. See infra Part III (considering potential incompatibility between current standard of
care analysis and EBM).
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good practice from the custom-based standard of care that courts traditionally
apply in medical malpractice actions, which maintains custom as the measure
of good care. 8 Part IV considers methods of remedying the disjunction
between legal theory and EBM.29 Part IV.A argues that courts should clarify
the duty to stay abreast of medical advances.30 Part IV.B contrasts the
physician's standard of care with care standards in other areas of law, in order
to draw instructive parallels to help inform the search for a framework to
modify standard of care analysis to successfully co-exist with EBM.3' Part
IV.C presents five frameworks for altering current standard of care analysis in
light of EBM. 32 Ultimately, this Note argues that the most advantageous
alteration of the standard of care analysis in light of EBM will diminish reliance
on custom as evidence of good care and clarify the physician's duty to stay
abreast of advances in medicine. It will advance the goals of clarity, ease of
application, and dynamism, without being over- or under-inclusive. 33 This
Note concludes by suggesting that courts should move to a modified custom or
modified CPG standard in the near-term but should consider bifurcating the
standard of care analysis into procedural and substantive components in the
long-term, as EBM acquires more adherents.34
II. Distinguishing Evidence-Based Medicine from Clinical
Practice Guidelines
In order to consider properly the effect that EBM will have on the standard
of care, it is necessary to first understand what EBM is and, conversely, what it
is not. To this end, this Note seeks to distinguish CPGs from EBM as a
threshold matter. The importance of the distinction is central to this Note's
analysis. If EBM consisted solely, or even primarily, of practicing medicine in
accordance with CPGs, this Note would serve little purpose. This Note
28. See infra Parts IILA-B (distinguishing medicine's shift away from reliance on custom
from continued reliance on custom in standard of care determinations).
29. See infra Part IV (considering ways to remedy potential incompatibility of legal
theory and EBM).
30. See infra Part IV.A (suggesting need to clarify duty to stay abreast).
31. See infra Part IV.B (contrasting legal treatment of physicians with other areas of law).
32. See infra Part IV.C (suggesting frameworks for altering standard of care analysis in
light of EBM).
33. See infra Part IV.C (setting goals for framework for altering standard of care).
34. See infra Part V (proposing modified custom-based or modified CPG framework
standard as best short-term alterations to standard of care analysis in light of EBM and
suggesting consideration of bifurcated standard in long-term).
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contends that EBM involves much more than CPGs; therefore, the legal
response to EBM must go beyond recognizing CPGs.
To some extent, CPGs and EBM are two solutions to the same problem.
Both are designed to improve physician decisionmaking. Furthermore, CPGs
and EBM are closely related. Many CPGs are evidence-based 5 and facilitate
the practice of EBM by serving as codifications of best evidence when
written.36 In this manner, CPGs are useful, if not essential components of
EBM. In addition to this interrelation, and the shared goal of improving
physician decisionmaking, the movements have inspired some of the same
responses. Critics have praised EBM for many of the same reasons that they
praise CPGs, and have criticized EBM for many of the reasons that they
criticize CPGs.37 But the similarities end there. Nevertheless, the general trend
within the legal community is to think of EBM only in the context of CPGs and
thereby miss important distinctions between the two movements. For example,
much of the legal scholarship regarding EBM has cited CPGs as the most
common embodiment of EBM and has failed to further distinguish the two
terms.3a So far, courts have followed suit by limiting their response to EBM to
consideration of CPGs.39 This Note contends that CPGs may help a physician
practice EBM, but they are not the only, or perhaps even the most desirable
manifestation of EBM.
The most frequently cited definition of EBM is "the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about
35. Not all CPGs are evidence-based. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 329 (2001) ("CPGs
are not necessarily based upon EBM."). Rosoff continues, "Guidelines generated primarily
through a professional consensus process-the traditional approach--may differ from those
based more directly on hard, empirical evidence-the EBM approach." Id.
36. See Noah, supra note 10, at 418 (noting important role of CPGs in disseminating
information).
37. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text (comparing reactions to CPGs with
EBM).
38. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 328 ("Because CPGs are the most common practical
embodiment of EBM, the terms 'clinical practice guidelines' and 'evidence-based medicine' and
their acronyms have often been used interchangeably, or nearly so."); Daniel W. Shuman,
Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 267,273 (2001)
(using terms interchangeably). To be sure, some scholars have recognized that a difference
exists. For example, Noah explains that "[c]linical practice guidelines are not... synonymous
with EBM, which represents something of a shift away from the more traditional consensus-
based, experiential approach to medicine. Practice guidelines can facilitate EBM, but clinicians
must know how to distinguish high quality guidelines from ones of a lesser caliber." Noah,
supra note 10, at 419. Nonetheless, the author believes that the legal community as a whole has
not yet fully recognized the distinction.
39. See infra Part iI.C (considering limited legal response to EBM).
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN THE LAW BEYOND CPGS 487
the care of individual patients., 40 The Institute of Medicine notes, "In response
to concerns that this definition failed to recognize the importance of other
factors in making clinical decisions, more recent definitions explicitly
incorporate clinical expertise and patient values into the decisionmaking
process.",4' An example of such a definition is: "Evidence-based medicine
(EBM) is the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and
patient values. '42 Both the original and more recent definitions emphasize the
use of current best evidence.43 Therefore, analytically one cannot limit EBM to
CPGs. Current best evidence at any point in time may coincide with the
standard of care expounded in a guideline, but they are not necessarily
synonymous. Professional associations could take years to formulate and
codify CPGs."4 In the meantime, medical science is constantly evolving. As a
result, CPGs cannot always reflect "current best evidence." Even if a guideline
reflects current best evidence when written, medical advances could soon
40. Sackett et al., supra note 4, at 71; see also David M. Eddy, The Use of Evidence and
Cost Effectiveness by the Courts: How Can It Help Improve Health Care?, 26 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 387, 402 (2001) (stating that above definition is "[t]he most commonly cited
definition of evidence-based medicine").
41. INST. OF MED., supra note 3, at 147 (citing Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Health Policy
Issues and Applications for Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines, 46
HEATH POLICY 1, 1-19 (1998)).
42. DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH
EBM 1 (2nd ed. 2000). The authors explain the components of their definition as follows:
By best research evidence we mean clinically relevant research, often from the
basic sciences of medicine, but especially from patient-centered clinical research
into the accuracy and precision of diagnostic tests (including the clinical
examination), the power of prognostic markers, and the efficacy and safety of
therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preventive regimens. New evidence from clinical
research both invalidates previously accepted diagnostic tests and treatments and
replaces them with new ones that are more powerful, more accurate, more
efficacious, and safer.
By clinical expertise we mean the ability to use our clinical skills and past
experience to rapidly identify each patient's unique health state and diagnosis, their
individual risks and benefits of potential interventions, and their personal values
and expectations.
Bypatient values we mean the unique preferences, concerns and expectations each
patient brings to a clinical encounter and which must be integrated into clinical
decisions if they are to serve the patient.
Id.
43. The first definition does so explicitly; the second does so implicitly by referring to
"best research evidence," then explaining that new evidence invalidates and replaces previously
accepted evidence. See id. (defining "best research evidence").
44. See Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care
Reform, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 157, 176 (1995) (identifying concern that CPGs will be outdated
before adopted).
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render such a guideline obsolete. 45  Rather than advocating that
physicians merely adhere to the direction of a CPG, EBM encourages
physicians to keep informed of current medical knowledge and to practice
accordingly. While valuable in their own right, CPGs are not the
functional equivalent of EBM as some scholars have suggested. In fact,
it is not only possible, but sometimes necessary to practice EBM without
using CPGs. 4 In addition, one can practice according to a CPG and not
be practicing EBM.47
Perhaps the most significant distinction between EBM and CPGs is
the difference between a content-focused analysis and a process-focused
one. CPGs identify the preferred practice in a given situation; EBM
specifies how a doctor should go about making a decision. CPGs focus
on content, answering the question: What is the best practice? EBM, on
the other hand, endeavors to improve decisionmaking by altering the
process by which physicians make decisions. Thus, EBM addresses the
question: How should a physician determine what the best practice is?
In summary, although EBM and CPGs are related, it is incorrect to
think they are synonymous. The propensity to treat them as such presents
not just a semantic mistake, but also could have a profound impact on the
legal reaction to EBM. Before considering the current limited legal
response to EBM, this Note briefly addresses the origins of the CPG and
EBM movements and presents positive and negative reactions to each.
45. See Noah, supra note 10, at 424 ("[P]ractice guidelines may quickly become
outdated."); Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity ofthe AgencyforHealthcare Research and Quality
Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 JAMA
1461, 1466 (200 1) (assessing current validity of seventeen Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality guidelines and estimating that half became obsolete in 5.8 years).
46. Although thousands of guidelines exist, CPGs cannot possibly cover every potential
situation. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Shipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587,631 (1994) ("[A] practice
guideline cannot be expected to apply to every clinical situation."). In addition, a physician
could face a situation in which a potentially relevant guideline is available, but for a variety of
reasons the physician feels it is inappropriate for the particular patient. Id. ("A multitude of
factors, including the gravity of the illness, co-occurring medical problems, and the prior
condition of the patient provide legitimate reasons for the non-applicability of what may
superficially appear to be a pertinent guideline.").
47. This situation could arise if a physician follows an outdated guideline or a guideline
that is not evidence-based. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 329 (recognizing that not all CPGs are
evidence-based).
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN THE LAWBEYOND CPGS 489
A. The Rise of Clinical Practice Guidelines
Scholars cite the twin problems of variation and lack of consensus
regarding the best medical treatment as reasons for the recent proliferation of
CPGs s As to the former, studies have shown that standards of good practice
may differ regionally, perhaps even significantly.49 This variation is in part due
to lack of consensus as to what constitutes best treatments and methods.50
Recently, insurers and managed care organizations have put pressure on
physicians to reduce variation by promulgating CPGs.5' The federal
government joined the effort to develop CPGs in 1989 by creating a new
agency within the Public Health Service to aid in guideline formulation, thus
underscoring the importance of these efforts.5 2 CPGs fight the problems of
variation and lack of consensus by expressing a consensus on best practices.53
Scholars have identified several additional reasons for the rise of CPGs,
including the following: combating the information explosion in medicine,1
4
48. See FuRRow ET AL.,supra note 15, at 42 (citing "combined problems of variation in
medical practice and lack of evidence of efficacy" of many treatments as impetus for "movement
toward practice parameters"); Noah, supra note 10, at 417 (noting that CPGs were "[i]nspired
initially by seemingly inexplicable geographic variations in practice patterns").
49. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise ofDeference to Custom: Malpractice Law
at the Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 163, 186-87 (2000) (identifying variations in
physician practice patterns). Peters quotes Dr. Jack Wennberg's well-known study on this topic,
which found:
[A] resident of New Haven, Connecticut, is about twice as likely to undergo a
coronary bypass operation as is a resident of Boston; for carotid endarterectomy,
the risks are the other way around. The numbers of knee and hip replacements per
capita are much more common among Bostonians, while New Havenites experience
substantially higher risks for hysterectomy and back surgery.
Id. at 187 (quoting Jack E. Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, 7
HEALTH AFF. 99, 99 (1988)). See also FuRROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 179 ("Different practice
styles exist in different regions, and even within states, based on a local concept of good
practice, as the locality rule litigation demonstrates.").
50. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 ("Although there are generally accepted
treatments for many diseases, and doctors can agree that there has been bad care in some cases,
for many others there are no generally agreed standards of what is 'the best' care.").
5 1. See id. at 179 (noting pressure placed on physicians by insurers and managed care
organizations to reduce variation by setting standards that specify treatments for particular
diseases).
52. See Noah, supra note 10, at 427 ("In 1989, Congress established the Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) in order to engage in outcomes research as well as
to facilitate the creation and distribution of clinical practice guidelines."). The name of the
agency is now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Id.
53. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 42 (suggesting ability of CPGs "to articulate
consensus on acceptable practice, and to disseminate information on the consensus").
54. See Deborah W. Gamick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and
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coordinating technology assessment and clinical practice, minimizing costs s6
and most importantly, improving health care. 7 CPGs also have the potential to
improve the medical malpractice system by reducing the amount and cost of
litigation. 8
While the clear trend within the medical community is to formulate
practice guidelines, one should not assume that every member of the
community endorses this movement. In fact, CPGs have inspired mixed
reactions in the medical community. On the one hand, physicians have
welcomed CPGs as a potentially beneficial source of information. s9 Similarly,
CPGs may provide a necessary abridgement of medical literature.60 CPGs may
also serve a signaling function by indicating the judgment of leaders in the
medical community.
6'
Others in the medical community view CPGs in a less positive light.
Some physicians see guidelines as an affront to professional autonomy or a
transition to "cookbook" medicine. 2 One source adeptly summarizes this
Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2857 (1991) (suggesting explosion of medical
information necessitates CPGs); Leahy, supra note 6, at 1487-91 (explaining how information
explosion in medicine has created need for practice guidelines).
55. See Leahy, supra note 6, at 1488-89 (explaining development and endorsement of
practice guidelines as response to "apparent lack of coordination between technology
assessment and clinical practice"). Leahy states, "The expanding application of sophisticated
technology to medical practice, and its attendant costs, has created the need for medical practice
guidelines for physicians." Id. at 1483.
56. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care in
Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2887 (1991) (explaining hope that practice
parameters will enable improved efficiency and thereby help control healthcare expenditures).
57. See William Meadow, Operationalizing the Standard of Medical Care: Uses and
Limitations of Epidemiology to Guide Expert Testimony in Medical Negligence Allegations, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 675, 694 (2002) (noting recent focus on practice guidelines as tools to
improve healthcare quality and patient outcomes).
58. See Garnick et al., supra note 54, at 2858 (suggesting that there are several ways in
which practice guidelines could reduce number of malpractice cases and costs of settling such
cases).
59. See Noah, supra note 10, at 418 (suggesting physicians appreciate CPGs as "source of
useful information").
60. See id. ("If nothing else, practice guidelines provide a handy abridgement of the
burgeoning biomedical literature.").
61. See Jodi Halpern, Can the Development of Practice Guidelines Safeguard Patient
Values?, 23 J.L. MED. & ETtncs 75, 75-76 (1995) (stating that guidelines enable physicians to
make decisions based on expert experience); Noah, supra note 10, at 418 (noting that CPGs
"also serve a signaling function, reflecting the judgments of leading experts in the field").
62. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 ("Physicians reject suggestions of what they
refer to as 'cookbook medicine'; recognizing the infinite variety of conditions, values, and
uncertainties, they are understandably reluctant to impose such standards on one another.");
Noah, supra note 10, at 418 (recognizing complaints that CPGs "promote 'cook book'
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point: "Simply put, it is often asserted that the art of medicine cannot be
relegated to the status of a cookbook.' ,63  Similarly, many physicians view
guidelines as a challenge to clinical judgment.64 The fact that there may be
more than one effective treatment in many instances bolsters arguments that
physicians should have flexibility in determining treatments.65 Likewise, CPGs
are based on generalities and therefore they may provide limited assistance for
66diagnosing or treating a particular patient. 6 Others suggest that guidelines
place a substantial, if not unattainable, burden on physicians to read and keep
up. 67 Scholars cite different figures for the number of guidelines currently in
existence, but even by a conservative estimate, the numbers are large. One
source puts the number at more than 1600 guidelines.68 Another suggests there
are more than 2000.69 Not only do the sheer numbers of guidelines hinder
medicine"); Arnold J. Rosoff, On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering into the
Mists at Point-&-Click Medicine, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 111, 115 (2002) ("Physicians have long
put CPGs down with the pejorative label 'cookbook medicine."' (citations omitted)); Edward
Felsenthal, Cookbook Care: Maine Limits Liability for Doctors Who Meet Treatment
Guidelines, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1993, at A] ("Many physicians attack checklists as paint-by-
numbers medicine that ignores the idiosyncracies of patients' conditions.").
63. Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 373,403 (2002).
64. See INST. OF MED., supra note 16, at 24 ("[M]any physicians, especially those longer
in practice, see guidelines as a challenge to clinical judgment and resist them as a threat to the
most fundamental element of professional autonomy.").
65. See FuRuow ETAL., supra note 15, at 179 ("Substantial regional variations exist in the
use of many procedures, with no apparent differences in outcome (life expectancy, morbidity,
days missed from work)." (citing Pamela Paul-Shaheen et a]., Small Area Analysis: A Review
and Analysis of the North American Literature, 12 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 741 (1987) and
John Wennberg & A. Gittlesohn, SmallArea Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE
1102 (1973))).
66. See E. Haavi Morreim, From the Clinics to the Courts: The Role Evidence Should
Play in Litigating Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 409, 422 (200 1) ("[E]ven the
best CPGs cannot possibly dictate each patient's course of care. They are based on generalities
that hold true on average, but have only limited room to accommodate the natural variations
among individuals in any population.").
67. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market?, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 825, 843-44 (1995) ("No one physician can
comprehend the totality of what is known; each must act based on his or her limited base of
knowledge and experience."); Rosoff, supra note 62, at 116 (recognizing "substantial burden"
on physicians to stay current with new guidelines and interpretations).
68. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645,685 (2001) (noting that
more than 1600 guidelines exist).
69. See Noah, supra note 10, at 418 ("More than 2000 guidelines exist today.").
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physicians, but guidelines also vary in quality.7° Potential conflicts of interest
may also create significant credibility problems with CPGs.7"
Putting aside the above-mentioned problems with CPGs, perhaps the
biggest question regarding the success of the standard-setting movement is
whether physicians will actually use guidelines. A physician might not practice
according to a guideline simply due to inertia or for financial reasons such as
reimbursement. 72 Recent studies suggest that the problem of physicians not
using guidelines could be substantial. 73  A study of the effect of the 1986
Canadian guidelines encouraging a lower rate of cesarean sections found little
impact on physician practice despite high physician awareness of the guidelines
and generally positive attitudes toward them.74 This study underscores the fact
that "many forces besides research evidence affect physician decisions,
including financial incentives favoring one approach over another, patient
pressure, and fears of malpractice. 7 5 Other recent studies from the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia indicate similar situations. 76 In the
70. See Robert S.A. Hayward et al., More Informative Abstracts ofArticles Describing
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 731, 731 (1993) ("Existing practice
guidelines... vary widely in their quality."); Morreim, supra note 66, at 422 ("CPGs abound,
many of them with dubious scientific credentials.").
71. See Noah, supra note 10, at 422 (noting that conflicts of interest can taint CPGs just
as they can taint underlying biomedical research literature). Noah explains further:
When specialty medical societies sponsor clinical practice guidelines, the financial
interests of their members may influence the resolution of contested issues .... In
some instances, insurance companies develop guidelines, which makes the potential
conflict of interest even more apparent .... It appears that pharmaceutical
companies also have managed to affect the content of clinical practice guidelines in
ways that give preference to the use of their products. Even if they do not directly
influence the formulation of guidelines, primary research funded by industry will
do so, and the disclosures of financial conflicts of interest in original journal
articles will not reappear in the secondary literature or practice guidelines that
emerge from this research.
Id. at 422-24 (citations omitted).
72. See FuRRow Er AL., supra note 15, at 179 (citing inertia and reimbursement as reasons
why physicians may continue to use old practices).
73. See id. (considering likelihood that physicians will adopt newly developed guidelines
in practice).
74. See id. at 43 (explaining study and citing Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice
Guidelines Guide Practice? The Effect of a Consensus Statement on the Practice ofPhysicians,
321 N. ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1989)).
75. Id.; see also Lomas et al., supra note 74, at 1310 ("In the absence of any
accompanying strategies to overcome these other influences, the dissemination of research
evidence in the form of practice guidelines issued by a national body is unlikely to have much
effect on inappropriate practices that are sustained by powerful nonscientific forces.").
76. See Amit Kumar Ghosh, M.D., Adherence to Evidence-Based Therapy: Some
Practical Problems (letter to the editor), ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. (June 10, 2002) (stating that
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United States, several studies indicate low rates of compliance with widely
disseminated guidelines relating to treating common cardiovascular
conditions.
77
B. The Rise of Evidence-Based Medicine
While the standard-setting movement developed recently, some scholars
trace the EBM movement to the ancient Greek philosophers,78 or to ancient
Chinese medicine. 79 Others suggest origins in post-revolutionary France. ° But
recent studies indicate many reasons why physicians do not implement evidence-based therapies
in addition to subspecialty culture and increasing pharmaceutical promotions). Ghosh expounds
upon the United Kingdom study:
In a qualitative analysis of physicians interviewed from the United Kingdom, 6
themes were identified that affected the implementation of evidence-based
therapies. These included the personal and professional experiences of the
physician, the patient-physician relationship, perceived tensions between primary
care physicians and specialists, physicians' feelings about their patients and the
evidence, words used by the physicians, and the logistics of general practice. Also,
the perception that treatment should be patient specific and not "disease specific"
could make certain physicians use their personal experience and incorporate
patients' values in managing their clinical problems and deviate from guidelines.
There is also a tendency to continue current treatment that the patient is accustomed
to, rather than prescribe a new drug based on the best available evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. See Michael W. Rich, From Clinical Trials to Clinical Practice: Bridging the GAP,
287 JAMA 1321, 1321 (2002) ("[S]tudy after study has demonstrated disconcertingly low rates
of compliance with widely disseminated evidence-based treatment guidelines for managing
common cardiovascular conditions including coronary heart disease, heart failure, and
hypertension.").
78. See Jyoti Arya et al., Evidence-Based Science: A Worthwhile Mode of Surgical
Inquiry, ARcI-vEs OF SURGERY, Nov. 2002, at 1301 (tracing evidence-based decisionmaking to
Aristotle and Lucretius). The authors state:
Arguably, Aristotle first created the discipline of science by insisting on a rigorous
delineation of evidence and a logic for the use of evidence to create theory. Several
hundred years later, Lucretius (in On the Nature of Things) dissected evidence-
based thinking into strict analytical precepts of axiom, terminology, and corollary.
Evidence-based thinking then hibernated in cold storage for almost 1500 years.
Id. at 1302.
79. See SACKETT Er AL., supra note 42, at 2 ("[A] colleague has nominated [an] origin in
ancient Chinese medicine.").
80. See id. at 1-2 (noting expression of ideas behind EBM in post-revolutionary Paris
"when clinicians like Pierre Louis rejected the pronouncements of authorities and sought the
truth in systematic observation of patients"). The authors exclaim, "For us, Louis's most
dramatic rejection was the authoritarian pronouncement that venesection was good for cholera!"
Id. at 2 n*.
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if EBM is not a new phenomenon, what explains all the recent attention?
Perhaps the novelty credited to EBM stems from the general trend of equating
the CPG movement and the EBM movement.8 Perhaps it is due to the rapid
spread of EBM over the past decade.82 David L. Sackett, the physician who
authored the most widely-accepted definition of EBM,83 and his co-authors note
that the current era of EBM began in Canada in 1992, when a group led by
Gordon Guyatt at McMaster University consolidated the underlying ideas and
named them EBM.84 The authors cite a subsequent explosion in articles about
evidence-based practice and an international outpouring of interest.
8 5
Much of the medical community sees great potential to improve patient
care through EBM. Scholars praise EBM for its scientific rigor and its
relatively unbiased approach to clinical problems.8 6 But, detractors cite various
problems with EBM.87 Many of these problems are the same or similar to
problems that critics cite regarding CPGs. 8' For example, the fear that
physicians will have to sacrifice autonomy in order to practice according to
guidelines echoes the fear that the EBM movement will alter the locus of
decisionmaking power in the medical community.89 Also, as noted above,critics have pointed out the potential for CPGs to overwhelm practitioners. 9°
81. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (distinguishing CPGs from EBM).
82. See SACKETT ET AL., supra note 42, at 2 (noting rapid spread of EBM since 1992).
83. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining EBM).
84. SACKETT ET AL., supra note 42, at 2.
85. Id. Sackett et al. explain:
Since [1992], the number of articles about evidence-based practice has grown
exponentially (from one publication in 1992 to about 1000 in 1998) and
international interest has led to the development of six evidence-based journals
(published in up to six languages) that summarize the most relevant studies for
clinical practice and have a combined worldwide circulation of over 175[,]000.
Id.
86. See 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
§ 20-2.4.1 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE] (noting positive aspects of EBM). The editors summarize the strengths of EBM as
follows: "In short, the strengths of evidence-based medicine include its systematic and
relatively unbiased approach to clinical questions, its scientific rigor, and the fact that it is a
method of accurately reflecting clinical realities in an arithmetical way." Id.
87. See SACKETT ET AL., supra note 42, at 7 ("The examination of the concepts and
practice of EBM by clinicians and academics has led to negative as well as positive reactions.").
88. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (discussing cited problems with CPGs).
89. See Noah, supra note 10, at 386 ("Outcomes research, like the EBM movement more
generally, may alter the locus of decisionmaking power in the health care community,
threatening the traditional hegemony of physicians while empowering statisticians and
managers.").
90. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (suggesting that guidelines place
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Some have cited the same potential problem with EBM.9' Additionally, like
CPGs, EBM may be difficult to apply to an individual patient.92 Both are also
potentially subject to problems of bias and conflicts of interest because both
EBM and CPGs require large clinical trials. Such trials are expensive and
sponsoring corporations predominantly bear the expense. 93 Thus, great
potential for financial conflicts of interest exists.94 In addition to financial
incentives, bias can also arise based on scientific beliefs.95 Finally, like the
physicians who are reluctant to use guidelines, some physicians maintain a
"stubborn and unreflective adherence to well-entrenched habits" despite the
increasing prominence of EBM.96
C. The Limited Legal Response to Evidence-Based Medicine
By calling the legal response to EBM "limited," this Note refers to the fact
that, thus far, the legal community has considered EBM only in the context of
CPGs.97 To date, only one reported case includes the phrase "evidence-based
medicine,"98 and it does so only in excerpting the affidavit of the defendant's
substantial, if not unattainable, burden on physicians to stay current).
91. See 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 86, at § 20-2.4.1 ("[Tlhe volume of
information required to be retained is monumental: no practitioner in the early 21 st century has
the time necessary to obtain all of this information, and more importantly, the ability to retain
it."); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 370 (2001) ("Practicing evidence-based medicine is not easy.
No clinician alone can absorb and synthesize the vast amount of literature available, make
judgments on its quality, and translate it into practice."); Noah, supra note 10, at 404
("Although physicians should have the training and expertise necessary to manage large
quantities of complex information, the pace of knowledge production and acquisition presents
significant challenges for the medical profession.").
92. 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 86, at § 20-2.4.1 (noting that EBM "is
very challenging to apply to individual patients").
93. Joseph S. Alpert, Conflicts of Interest: Science, Money, and Health, 162 ARCHIVEs OF
INTERNAL MED. 635,635 (2002) ("The large clinical trials required by evidence-based medicine
involve major financial investment by the sponsoring corporation.").
94. Id. at 636 ("Because of the economic reality of clinical research, the potential for
financial COI is substantial."). Alpert suggests that clearly identifying the potential conflicts
may remedy the potential problem of financial conflicts of interest. Id.
95. Id. ("Bias in presentation of data and opinion may be based on strongly held scientific
and medical opinion, or it may be based on financial considerations.").
96. Noah, supra note 10, at 383; see also FURROW ETAL.,supra note 15, at 13 ("Scientific
and balanced analysis of the costs, risks, and benefits of different treatments is still the
exception, not the rule.").
97. See supra note 38 (noting failure of legal community to adequately distinguish EBM
from CPGs).
98. The author conducted a computerized search of reported cases through September
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expert witness.99 Even the current judicial response to EBM involving CPGs as
evidence of the standard of care has been sparse and inconsistent) °°
Nevertheless, over the past two decades, a great deal of scholarship has
addressed the role of CPGs in medical malpractice actions.10' Eleanor Kinney
2003 and found only one case that included the term "evidence-based medicine." (Search "All
State and Federal Cases" database on Westlaw for "evidence-based medicine"). No cases
included the term "evidence-based practice." (Search same database for "evidence-based
practice").
99. See Gabbard v. Linn-Benton Hous. Auth., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135-36 (D. Or.
2002) (including term "evidence-based medicine" in excerpt of affidavit of defendants' expert
witness). In Gabbard, plaintiffs claimed to suffer from multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome.
Id. at 1132. Plaintiff James Gabbard brought an action against the manager of his apartment
complex contending that the manager's use of various chemicals violated the Fair Housing Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Id. Plaintiff Jan Wroncy
brought an action against the Oregon Department of Transportation asserting that the
Department's use of chemical herbicides along its highways violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Id. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment holding
that the testimony of plaintiffs' expert concerning MCS was not sufficiently reliable. Id. at
1141. Although it does not discuss EBM further, the court cited counts 13-15 of the affidavit of
defendants' expert, which alleged that plaintiff Gabbard's physicians and experts do not practice
EBM and that claims of chemically-induced MCS are not supported by EBM. Id. at 1135-36.
100. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 335. Rosoffexplains:
The relatively few courts that have dealt with CPGs have varied widely in their
treatment as evidence. In some instances, CPGs have simply been deemed
inadmissible .... In future cases, pursuant to state legislation fostering CPG
development and use, some courts will admit them only for use by the defense.
Even where they can be introduced by both parties to a litigation, there is a range of
alternatives as to how much weight they will be given. Certainly, it will be some
time before there are settled conventions for the use of CPGs and for instructing
juries on the matter.
ld.
101. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J.L.
MED. & ETIcs 323, 329 (2001) ("Since the 1980s, there has been a wealth of scholarship
examining the role of medical practice guidelines and other standards of care in medical
malpractice litigation."); see also Troyen A. Brennan, Practice Guidelines and Malpractice
Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 67, 67-86 (1991)
(considering potential role of CPGs in medical malpractice litigation); Mark A. Hall, The
Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 119, 119-45 (1991) (exploring prospects for medical practice policies to reform
malpractice law); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards Governing
Physician Liability, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 87-117 (1991) (considering usefulness of
practice guidelines in medical malpractice law); Hirshfeld, supra note 56, at 2886-91
(examining potential use of CPGs as standard of care); Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical
Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. OF HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 289, 289-313 (1996) (discussing use of guidelines by courts and state legislatures);
Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current Malpractice
Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 421, 421-50 (1989)
(analyzing how medical standards may be used in medical malpractice actions); Mello, supra
note 68, at 645-710 (discussing role of CPGs in medical malpractice litigation); Megan L.
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notes, "Much of this scholarship assesses the use of medical standards as
evidence of the tort standard of care from the perspective of defendant
physicians or plaintiffs."'' 0 2 Kinney explains further that scholars see the "[u]se
of medical practice guidelines in malpractice litigation.., as an important
reform to clarify the tort standard of care and even to serve as an affirmative
defense to complying physicians."'' 0 3 Some states, "such as Florida, Kentucky,
Maine, and Maryland, have adopted statutes to use medical practice guidelines
in this manner."104 However, despite enacting a statute in 1995 to encourage
the promulgation of CPGs, the Maryland legislature initially mandated that
parties could not use those guidelines in litigation. 05 The legislature
subsequently removed this restriction.
0 6
Some courts allow the use of guidelines as evidence of the standard of care
if an expert witness introduces them as testamentary anchors. 107 Although
guidelines offer presumptive evidence of the duty of care, courts may still
Sheetz, Note, Toward Controlled Clinical Care Through Clinical Practice Guidelines: The
Legal Liability for Developers and Issuers of Clinical Pathways, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1341,
1341-80 (1997) (considering potential liability of developers of CPGs).
102. Kinney, supra note 101, at 329.
103. Id. (citing E.D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments,
Future Successes?, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 99, 99-136 (1995)).
104. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 408.02 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035 (Michie
1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-79 (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE At., Health-
Gen. I § 19-1602 (2000); D.W. Shuman, The Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Claims,
Clinical Practice Guidelines, and Managed Care: Towards a Therapeutic Harmony?, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 99, 105 (1997)).
105. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 335 ("[A] 1995 Maryland statute enacted to encourage
guidelines development provided that CPGs developed under the program it established could
not be used in litigation (MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. Section 19-606), a restriction that has
since been removed from the legislation.").
106. Id.
107. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 178 ("Clinical practice guidelines, so long as
they are developed by an expert witness as a testamentary anchor, will be allowed in evidence to
help establish the standard of care. They can also be used to impeach the opinion of an expert
witness."). The authors cite Roper v. Blumenfeld, 706 A.2d 1151, 1155 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998), in which the defendant used 1992 Parameters of Care for Oral and Maxiofacial
Surgery: A Guide of Practice, Monitoring and Evaluation during cross examination of
plaintiff's expert. The authors explain the use of the guidelines as follows:
As used to impeach, it was permissible to counter the doctor's opinion that because
plaintiff was injured during defendant's failed attempt at extraction, defendant must
have deviated from the standard of care because the injury is not a medically
accepted risk of the procedures he performed. "As to this claim, the article is quite
relevant for it lists as a known risk and complication of 'erupted' teeth '[olral-facial
neurologic dysfunction."'
Id. (quoting Roper, 706 A.2d at 1156).
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require expert testimony to introduce and explain the standard.'0 8 Although
some commentators have suggested that CPGs should only be admissible for
use by one side to a dispute,1°9 "[c]ourts have allowed plaintiffs to introduce
clinical practice guidelines as inculpatory evidence where physicians have
deviated from those recommendations, and they have allowed defendants to
make use of practice guidelines as exculpatory evidence."" 0
ll. The Potential Incompatibility of Current Standard of Care Analysis and EBM
This Part considers the potential incompatibility between current standard of care
analysis and EBM. In so doing, it first addresses the question of whether it is logical
for courts to continue to use custom as a barometer to judge good medical practice
when physicians themselves are questioning the reliability of custom as an indicator of
good medicine. This Part suggests that a custom-based standard may have chilling
effects on physicians' efforts to move away from accepted practice in favor of high-
grade scientific evidence and therefore may be incompatible with EBM. This Part also
considers the paradox of the largely undefined duty to stay abreast of medical advances
and whether it affords courts the ability to impose liability for not practicing EBM.
A. Medicine's Shift Away from Reliance on Custom
EBM "challenges consensus-based judgments"' ' 1and "deemphasizes average
practice as an adequate standard."'" 2 It is "portrayed as an alternative to medicine
108. See id. at 180 ("[G]uidelines provide a particularized source of standards against
which to judge the conduct of the defendant physician. A widely accepted clinical standard may
be presumptive evidence of due care, but expert testimony will still be required to introduce the
standard and establish its sources and its relevancy.").
109. See Hirshfeld, supra note 56, at 2887 (noting arguments for use of CPGs only by
defendant physicians).
110. Noah, supra note 10, at 462. As examples of cases allowing plaintiffs to introduce
guidelines, Noah cites James v. Woolley, 523 So. 2d 110, 112 (Ala. 1988); Pollard v.
Goldsmith, 572 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Nelson v. Hammon, 802 P.2d 452,454-
57 (Colo. 1990); Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 182 (D.C. 1990);
Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000, 1005 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Monusko v.
Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) and Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem. Hosp.,
747 S.W.2d 361,364 (Tex. 1988). Id. at 462 n.405. As examples of cases allowing defendants
to use guidelines, Noah cites Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 n.2 (1 1th Cir. 1993) and
Parker v. Southwest La. Hosp. Ass'n, 540 So. 2d 1270, 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 462
n.406.
111. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 369.
112. Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, Proof and Policy from Medical Research
Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 249, 253 (2001).
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based on authority, tradition, and the physician's personal experience.""' 3 EBM
encourages physicians to apply "critical assessment of the available research to
decide if there is methodologically sound evidence that the outcomes of a
clinical option are favorable."'"14 While a physician practicing by traditional
methods may base a decision first and foremost on "tradition, [his] most recent
experience, what [he] learned years ago in medical school, or what [he has]
heard from [his] friends," " 5 a physician practicing EBM makes decisions based
on an order of preference that descends from sources containing broader
evidence to, eventually, personal experience." 6
A physician begins by considering systematic reviews of randomized
controlled trials (RCTs).' 17 Next, the physician examines individual controlled
clinical trials followed by uncontrolled studies."18  Finally, the physician
considers anecdotal evidence of clinical observations. 19 Thus, a significant
distinction between traditional practice and EBM is the reduced prominence of
personal clinical experience. While personal experience remains a component
of decisionmaking, it is no longer the primary component. 120 In addition,
knowledge physicians acquire in medical school and from colleagues also loses
prominence.
B. The Continuing Prevalence of Custom in Standard of Care Analysis
Having considered the extent to which EBM represents a departure from
basing medical decisions on customary practices, this Note will now examine
113. Marc A. Rodwin, The Politics of Evidence-Based Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 439, 439 (2001).
114. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 369.
115. Id. at 369-70.
116. See USERS' GUIDES TO THE MEDICAL LITERATURE: ESSENTIALS OF EVIDENCE-BASED
CLINICAL PRACTICE 13 (Gordon Guyatt & Drummond Rennie eds., 2002) (presenting hierarchy
of strength of evidence for treatment decisions and stating that "(tihe hierarchy implies a clear
course of action for physicians addressing patient problems: they should look for the highest
available evidence from the hierarchy"). Noah describes the decisionmaking process as follows:
"When faced with a clinical problem, health care professionals should, in descending order of
preference, look for guidance in systematic reviews of randomized controlled trials, the results
of individual controlled clinical trials, observational (uncontrolled) studies, and anecdotal
reports of clinical observations." Noah, supra note 10, at 381.
117. Noah, supra note 10, at 381.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. While "[p]ersonal clinical experience remains an essential predicate for the
effective application of EBM ... it should not provide the primary basis for making treatment
decisions." Id. (citations omitted).
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the extent to which medical custom remains prevalent in legal standard of care
analysis. This Part presents an overview of the custom-based standard of care
that courts have traditionally used to determine medical malpractice liability.
This Part concludes that, while some evidence suggests judicial deference to
custom may be weakening, custom remains integral to standard of care analysis
either through the standard of care itself or through the current evidentiary
framework. For these reasons, current standard of care analysis is potentially
inconsistent with the practice of EBM.
1. Traditional Custom-Based Standard of Care
Traditionally, custom established the standard of care in medical
malpractice actions. Under a custom-based standard, practicing in accordance
with accepted practice generally precludes liability. Medical malpractice law is
unique in this regard because in other areas of negligence law, defendants are
subject to a standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.' 2' Physicians
have "traditionally... needed only to conform to the customs of their peers."'
' 22
Esteemed torts scholar William Prosser explains that the traditional standard of
care in medical malpractice actions is simply "what is customary and usual in
the profession."' 23 Many commentators suggest that the law, by allowing this
custom-based standard, gives physicians a privilege that few others enjoy-that
of determining their own legal standards.
2 4
121. Peters, supra note 49, at 163.
122. Id.
123. WILLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971) (citations
omitted).
124. See id. ("It has been pointed out often enough that this gives the medical
profession... the privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of setting
their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices." (citations
omitted)); see also PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLC
POLICY 16, 139-40 (1985) (stating that deviation from reliance on custom-based standard is
"rare"); FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 361 (same); DAVID M. HARNEY, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 89 (1973) (stating that custom defines standard of care) (citations omitted); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 189 (5th ed. 1984) (same);
SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 7, 101 (1978)
(same); CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 55 (2d ed. 1980)
(stating that custom is rule in medical malpractice); James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A.
Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining
Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1994) (same); Allan H. McCoid, The
Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 560, 605-06 (1959) (same);
Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLuM. L. REV. 1147,1147,1158 (1942) (stating
that custom normally should define standard of care); Peters, supra note 49, at 163 (citing
Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 125 (Ct. App. 1992)); Theodore
500
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Scholars identify several theories to explain this special treatment of the
medical community. One of the most frequently cited explanations for judicial
deference to medical custom is respect for medical professionals. 125 Another
justification is "the inability of laymen to evaluate the technical judgments of
specialists."'126 One commentator explains, "Courts have recognized the fact
that laymen lack the capacity to adequately evaluate a physician's conduct or to
adequately determine what a reasonable and prudent man under the same
circumstances with specialized training and knowledge would have done." 
27
Whatever the underlying rationale for this special treatment is, for the medical
profession, customary practice is generally the barometer by which to measure
good care, and courts instruct juries that the plaintiff cannot recover unless he
or she proves that the defendant's conduct was "not in accord with recognized
medical practice."' 12' Thus, a plaintiff rarely can recover when the defendant
physician complied with the customary standard of care. 29
Although some scholars suggest that adherence to the custom-based
standard of care is waning, 3 legal texts and treatises still claim that a custom-
Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical
Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1212 (stating that custom determines standard of care).
125. See Peters, supra note 49, at 195 ("An abiding trust in the professionalism and
faithfulness of physicians resonated throughout the early legal commentary defending or
explaining the customary standard of care."). Peters notes that later commentary echoed the
same theme. Id. at 195.
126. DANZON, supra note 124, at 140.
127. Neil Meltzer, Case Comment, Helling v. Carey: Landmark or Exception in Medical
Malpractice; Compliance With The Medical Standard of Care May Not Protect The Specialist
From Liability, II NEW. ENG. L. REv. 301, 308 (1975).
128. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 178 (1 0th ed.
2000).
129. Id.; see also Peter D. Jacobson & Matthew L. Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in
the Courts: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 291, 300
(2001) ("In relatively rare instances, courts will allow a plaintiff to challenge the adequacy of
customary medical practice, resulting in a higher standard of care than that determined
appropriate by the profession.").
130. See Peters, supra note 49, at 187-88 (arguing that deference to custom in setting
standard of care in medical malpractice actions is declining). Peters states that courts are
moving away from basing the standard of care on custom and moving towards employing a
reasonable physician standard. Id. He explains:
The present state of affairs is complicated, but the trend is clear. One quarter of the
states expressly have rejected deference to customary standards. Another twenty-
percent have rephrased their standard of care in terms of reasonability rather than
custom. Although the commitment of this last group of states has yet to be tested
directly, these states certainly cannot be classified as custom-based states. In
addition, confusing or contradictory case law in seven other states precludes
confident classification. That leaves fewer than half of the states with law that
clearly endorses a custom-based standard of care. Even in these states, the
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based standard persists. 3' Undoubtedly, the state of the law is confusing.13 2
Much of this confusion stems from the fact that at times courts have departed
from custom in various ways. Perhaps the most famous example of judicial
deviation from the traditional custom-based standard of care in a medical
malpractice case is Helling v. Carey.' In Helling, the Supreme Court of
Washington departed from a custom-based standard in favor of judicial
risk/benefit analysis. 34 The Helling court held, as a matter of law, that two
ophthalmologists were negligent for failing to give a simple pressure test to
screen for glaucoma in a patient under the age forty despite the fact that it was
not custom in the practice to give such a test to an individual under forty.'
One scholar refers to Helling as "[t]he most extreme example of a court
rejecting the customary practice standard."' 136 Was Helling a "wake-up call" as
some scholars claim,' 7 or merely a "rogue case" as others assert?' 31 The fact
that few courts have followed the example of Helling suggests the latter. 
39
In addition to departing from a custom-based standard in favor of
judicial risk/benefit analysis, some courts have employed a reasonable
authority of the custom-based standard of care is illusory. Many courts in states
with a custom-based standard do not appear to enforce it. The hegemony of
custom-based standards is over.
Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
131. See 70 C.J.S. Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Health-Care Providers § 64 (1987)
("[A] physician or other health-care provider is required and is only required to possess and
exercise the degree of skill and learning possessed and exercised, under similar circumstances,
by the members of his profession."); 2002 MED. MALPRACTICE (MB) § 9.05 ("The
reasonableness of a physician's conduct depends on the customary conduct of other physicians
under the same or similar circumstances" (citing Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493 (Ariz. 1978);
Decker v. Gibbons, 468 S.W.2d 252 (Ark. 1971); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa
1973); Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977); Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash.
1979))).
132. Compare FURROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 170 ("Most jurisdictions give professional
medical standards conclusive weight, so that the trier of fact is not allowed to reject the practice
as improper.") with Peters, supra note 49, at 187-88 (arguing that courts no longer defer to
custom).
133. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
134. Id. at 983.
135. Id.
136. Donald E. Kacmar, Note, The Impact of ComputerizedMedical Literature Databases
on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Timefor Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up Call?, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 636 (1997).
137. Id. at617.
138. See Peters, supra note 49, at 171 (noting that scholarly literature has generally
considered Helling a "rogue case").
139. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 199 (citing Hellingas "one of a small number of
cases rejecting a customary medical practice").
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physician standard to determine liability. In a recent article, Philip Peters
conducts a fifty state survey and concludes that courts are rejecting a
custom-based standard in favor of a reasonable physician standard. 40 This
standard more closely resembles the ordinary negligence standard courts
apply in cases not involving professionals.' 4' Another variation involves
"courts utiliz[ing] the 'best judgment' wrinkle to find negligence,
notwithstanding a physician's adherence to customary practice, where
defendant's choice among the available alternatives was unreasonable in
light of contrary data."'' 42 Courts have also departed from a pure custom-
based standard by imposing a duty to stay abreast of medical advances,
which is discussed below. 143
Although each of these departures undermines the primacy of custom
in standard of care determinations, this Note contends that custom remains
a key component of the analysis. Regardless of how courts frame the
standard, custom is still relevant, if not central.' 44 In addition, Peters
himself underscores the fact that really understanding what courts are doing
involves making difficult empirical judgments. 14' Thus, the actual number
of courts that have departed from a custom-based standard may be less than
the number Peters has suggested.
140. See Peters, supra note 49, at 187-88 ("Modem malpractice law is moving slowly
away from a custom-based standard of care and toward a reasonable physician standard.").
141. Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those
Who Know, 37 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 699,699-700 (2002) (describing standard courts apply to
nonprofessionals as a "normative 'reasonable care' standard").
142. Kacmar, supra note 136, at 638.
143. See infra Part I1I.D (discussing duty to stay abreast).
144. See Cramm et al., supra note 141, at 708 (noting that "the incipient trend toward
modifying custom as conclusive does not render it irrelevant"); Noah, supra note 10, at 458
(noting that even if the "tradition of complete judicial deference to medical custom may be
waning, adherence (or non-adherence) to customary medical practice will continue to play a
significant role in the resolution of most malpractice lawsuits").
145. See Peters, supra note 49, at 188 ("The classifications undertaken here required the
personal interpretation of judicial and legislative text. Even under ideal circumstances, a
considerable amount of discretion is inherent in this endeavor."). Peters continues:
Many of the judicial opinions surveyed for this Article had a proclivity for unclear
or inconsistent language, sometimes using terms from both [the custom-based and
the reasonable physician] tests interchangeably. Indeed, American courts
historically have believed that compliance with customary practice defined
reasonable care for professionals. As a result, the language used in many opinions
contains elements of both formulations.
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2. The Perpetuation of Custom Through the Evidentiary Framework
While some jurisdictions may be moving away from deference to custom
in their phraseology of the standard of care, the degree to which a medical
practice is unique or generally accepted remains part of the evidentiary
framework. 46 Thus, even when courts claim to employ a standard of care that
is not based on custom, they nonetheless may allow evidence of custom to play
a paramount role in the analysis. Generally, courts allow evidence of custom
and may exclude evidence of the effectiveness of the custom. As Peters
explains, "Because the issue to be decided is what physicians do, not why they
do it, evidence of the ineffectiveness of customary practices sometimes is
excluded from evidence." 
47
In addition, the use of expert witnesses may perpetuate the prevalence of
custom. Unlike other areas of negligence, in medical malpractice cases courts
ordinarily require expert testimony to establish the standard of care. 148 The fact
that experts testify may not, in and of itself, perpetuate the role of custom. But,
the substance of expert testimony may have that precise effect. Generally,
experts do not testify as to what the expert himself would have done, or to
whether what the defendant did was reasonable, but rather an expert testifies to
what other physicians ordinarily do. 149 One source explains, "Normally, parties
have to introduce expert testimony in order to identify customary practice."' 50
In this manner, expert testimony is grounded in custom. As long as this
remains the case, custom will remain inextricably linked to the physician's
standard of care.
146. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing "general acceptance criterion").
147. Peters, supra note 49, at 166 (citing Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990-91 (2d
Cir. 1987)); see also FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 169-70 (noting defendants do not offer
evidence of effectiveness)).
148. 61 Am. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 318 (2002) ("Asa general
rule, medical negligence may only be established by expert medical testimony." (citing Gatlin v.
Methodist Med. Ctr., Inc., 772 So. 2d 1023 (Miss. 2000); Casey v. Levine, 621 N.W.2d 482
(Neb. 2001))); id. at § 321 ("In the great majority of malpractice cases, a plaintiffmust establish
by expert testimony both the standard of care and the defendant's failure to conform to that
standard." (citing Smith v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 2d 561 (D.S.C. 2000))).
149. 1d. at § 319 ("[T]estimony may be introduced to establish that the defendant
negligently carried out his professional duties and departed from the standard of care exercised
by other physicians." (emphasis added) (citing Freed v. Piore, 372 A.2d 895 (Pa. Super 1977))).
But see Cramm et al., supra note 141, at 710-11 (suggesting physicians do not actually know
how other physicians practice and therefore experts can only guess at customary practice).
150. Noah, supra note 10, at 460 (citing Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620,622 (Me. 1979);
Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Wash. 1983); Vassos v.
Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Wyo. 1983)).
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Additionally, because the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. s'5 includes a "general
acceptance" criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence, barriers to the
introduction of novel medical evidence remain.' 52 One scholar suggests that
through Daubert, the Supreme Court has asked courts to transition from an
expectation of "general acceptance" to an expectation of reliable scientific
evidence.'53 This statement suggests a move away from custom. However,
"general acceptance remains a part of the admissibility gateway, and courts may
attach inordinate weight to Daubert's general acceptance prong leaving
[parties] with problems similar to those encountered in jurisdictions deferring to
medical custom.' 5 4 Thus, a physician desiring to defend a malpractice action
on the basis that EBM led him to disregard custom might be hindered in his
effort to introduce the scientific evidence that contributed to his decision if it
has not yet reached "general acceptance." Likewise, a plaintiff asking a court to
impose liability on a physician for not practicing EBM will be similarly
hindered.
C. Illustrating the Dangers of Inconsistencies Between Custom-Based
Standard of Care Analysis and EBM
To illustrate the potential inconsistencies between custom-based standard
of care analysis and EBM, consider the dilemma a physician faces when high-
15 1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, two minor
children and their parents brought an action against the manufacturer of Bendectin, alleging that
the mother's prenatal ingestion of Bendectin contributed to the children's birth defects. id. at
579. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant based on expert
testimony that extensive published scientific literature had not shown Bendectin to be a risk
factor for human birth defects. Id. The District Court excluded testimony of eight other experts
"who based their conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies, chemical
structure analyses, and the unpublished 'reanalysis' of previously published human statistical
studies," on the ground that such evidence did not satisfy the "general acceptance" standard for
the admissibility of expert witnesses. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. In vacating the
decisions of the lower courts, the Court held that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
superceded the "general acceptance" test. Id. at 585-89. The Court then proposed a list of
factors that judges could consider in weighing the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at
593-94. One of the factors is "general acceptance." Id.
152. See id. at 593-94 (providing list of factors judges may consider in determining
admissibility of scientific evidence). Of course, Daubert affects only federal jurisdictions and
those states that pattern their evidence rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
153. Morreim, supra note 66, at 421 ("[T]his expectation of reliable scientific evidence
rather than 'general practice or acceptance' is precisely the transition that the Supreme Court
has asked courts to make, in the move from Frye to Dauber.").
154. Kacmar, supra note 136, at 648.
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grade scientific evidence suggests deviating from custom. In the physician's
judgment, he can best serve the patient by departing from what other doctors
would ordinarily do. However, the physician recognizes the danger of liability
for such a deviation. Here, the law may perpetuate care that is less than the best
available. As David Eddy explains, "Currently, many physicians claim to feel
that a particular practice is inappropriate, and that they would personally prefer
not to do it but are compelled to do it out of fear that they will be compared to a
community standard."' 55 He continues, "The result is that they all do it, which
in turn makes it the community standard, which further entrenches the
practice."156
The normative question of the degree to which custom should set the
standard of care is certainly not new. A century ago, Justice Holmes stated,
"What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it
usually is complied with or not."' 5 7 Judge Learned Hand's comments in the
well-known case of the T. J. Hooper 8 similarly illustrate the fact that many
courts have long been skeptical about the validity of custom as a measuring
stick.5 9 Judge Hand stated:
There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice
of the calling the standard of proper diligence .... Indeed in most cases
reasonable prudence is in fact a common prudence; but strictly it is never
its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new
and available devices. It never may set its own test, however persuasive be
its uses. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission. 160
155. Eddy, supra note 40, at 401; see also FURROW ETAL., supra note 15, at 170 (noting
tension that custom-based standard creates for physicians who desire to reject dangerous
customary practices in favor of new practices when medical community has not yet generally
accepted new practices).
156. Eddy, supra note 40, at 401.
157. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468,470(1903).
158. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). In the T.J. Hooper, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a petition from the Eastern Transportation
Company, the owner of two tugs that lost barges at sea during a storm, to exonerate, or at least
limit liability. Id. at 737. The trial court found the tugs unseaworthy because they did not carry
radio receiving sets through which to receive storm warnings. Id. The trial court reasoned that
had the tugs carried radios, they could have avoided the storm and the ensuing loss of the
barges. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed on similar reasoning. Id. at 740.
159. See id. at 740 (refusing to exonerate tugboat owners of negligence liability for failing
to equip tugs with radio receivers).
160. Id. (citations omitted).
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In addition to prominent justices and judges, commentators have also
expressed concern over the wisdom of the prominence of custom. As one
scholar argues, "[T]he bare fact that physicians commonly practice or accept a
particular pattern of care unfortunately tells us too little about whether that
pattern is salutary for patients."' 6' Despite these protests, courts have used
custom as the predominant measure of appropriateness. 62 However, the EBM
movement, with its emphasis on the use of "current best evidence," provides
new strength to the argument that reliance on custom to set the standard of care
is inappropriate. In fact, it is not at all clear that a custom-based standard can
co-exist harmoniously with EBM. If the goal of the EBM movement is to push
physicians away from following the community or customary standard when
science suggests a different approach, is not judicial reliance on custom a
hindrance to EBM? In other words, if the professional custom is not backed by
evidence or disregards science, does not the "continued focus [of courts] on
professional custom for setting the legally recognized standard of care
reinforce[] this disregard of scientific knowledge?"'' 63  If so, the legal
community should begin to focus on "how the legal system might ease, or at
least not impede, the adoption of evidence-based practices."'T 6 Arguably,
custom-based standard of care analysis does little to encourage the adoption of
evidence-based practice and may in fact impede its adoption. Therefore,
deference to custom may simply not be dynamic enough to be an effective
measure of appropriateness in light of EBM.
The counter-argument relies on the fact that a custom-based standard of
care is a self-elevating standard. As evidence demonstrates the danger or
efficacy of a treatment or procedure, the medical profession will either reject or
adopt it. One scholar asserts that adherence to a custom-based standard does
not mean that "dangerous practices will go unchecked or required procedures
will be ignored."' 65 The argument continues, "When the negative aspects of a
medical technique have been demonstrated by systematic and reliable studies,
the accepted practice standard would probably compel repudiation of the
untoward practice."'' 66 However, for all but the most remarkable discoveries,
there is undoubtedly a lag time between discovery and general acceptance by
161. Morreim, supra note 66, at 420-21.
162. See supra Part I1I.B (considering role of custom in medical malpractice law).
163. Clark C. Havighurst et al., Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 195, 203 (2001).
164. Id. at 209.
165. Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The
"Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1251 (1975).
166. Id.
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the profession. 167 Therefore, one consequence of the custom-based standard of
care is that a doctor need not use the latest techniques or incorporate state-of-
the-art procedures until the profession generally accepts them. 168 Conversely, a
doctor employing old or outdated techniques need not fear liability as long as
the profession still predominantly employs those techniques.' 69 Thus, under a
custom-based standard, malpractice liability determinations may lag behind the
latest information and techniques available in a field. '
70
D. The Duty to Stay Abreast
The above discussion has suggested current standard of care analysis
might discourage physicians from practicing EBM. Paradoxically, the current
situation also might mandate the practice of EBM. This counter-intuitive
notion stems from the fact that courts have long asserted the power to impose
liability upon a physician who does not remain abreast of the latest medical
science. Courts began asserting the duty to stay abreast long before the EBM
movement caught the attention of the legal community, some as early as the
mid-nineteenth century.' 7 ' Although courts will not require a physician "to
167. See Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in
Medicine, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 485 (2002) ("Acceptance of new practice approaches
engendered by new technology takes time.").
168. See id. at 471 (2002) (distinguishing medical malpractice standard of care from that of
other areas of negligence law (citing Angela Roddey Holder, Failure to "Keep Up" as
Negligence, 224 JAMA 1461, 1462 (1973))); Kacmar, supra note 136, at 621 ("Ordinarily, until
the medical community adopts a particular procedure, technique, or methodology, a physician is
not negligent for failing to discover, consider, or adopt it."). Sokol and Molzen note, "The
medical standard of care, unlike traditional duty analysis in ordinary negligence cases, does not
require the newest techniques or utilization of state-of-the-art procedures unless it can be shown
that the techniques or procedures have gained general acceptance in the medical community."
Sokol & Molzen, supra note 167, at 471.
169. Id.
170. See id. ("For this reason, standard of care determinations often trail the latest medical
information and techniques being introduced into the practitioner's area of expertise.").
171. The earliest example is McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 266 (1853) (noting that
physicians have duty to attune themselves to latest science). In McCandless, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated:
[l]n a given case, regard is to be had to the advanced state of the profession at the
time. Discoveries in the natural sciences for the last half-century have exerted a
sensible influence on all the learned professions, but especially on that of medicine,
whose circle of truths has been relatively much enlarged. And besides, there has
been a positive progress in that profession resulting from the studies, the
experiments, and the diversified practice of its professors. The patient is entitled to
the benefit of these increased lights. The physician or surgeon who assumes to
exercise the healing art, is bound to be up to the improvements of the day. The
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN THE LAW BEYOND CPGS 509
possess extraordinary knowledge and ability that belongs to a few men of rare
endowment, [courts may require him] 'to keep abreast of the times and to
practice in accordance with the approved methods and means of treatment in
general use."72 A typical formulation of the duty to stay abreast qualifies a
custom-based standard of care by adding language such as "taking into
account," "having regard to," or "in light of' advances in medical science. 171
standard of ordinary skill is on the advance; and he who would not be found
wanting, must apply himself with all diligence to the most accredited sources of
knowledge.
Id. at 269.
172. STEVEN E. PEGALIS & H.F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAw OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §
3:11 (1992) (citing Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760 (N.Y. 1898); Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen
Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968)); see also Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 13 (1 st Cir.
1998) (applying Massachusetts law and stating, "A physician is held to the standard of care and
skill of the average practitioner of the medical specialty in question, taking into account the
advances in the profession" (citing Poysner v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 436, 438-39 (D.
Mass. 1984))); Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 187 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Tennessee
law and stating, "In determining the degree of learning and skill required of a medical
practitioner in the treatment of a particular case, regard must be given to the state of medical
science at the time." (citing Ogle v. Noe, 6 Tenn. App. 485 (1927))); Carr v. Shifflette, 82 F.2d
874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ("It is established law that it is the duty of a physician when
practicing his profession to exercise the ordinary care and skill of that profession in a similar
locality, giving due consideration to modem advancement and learning.").
173. See, e.g., McBride v. Saylin, 56 P.2d 941, 941 (Cal. 1936) (stating that test to
determine physician's liability for malpractice is whether "the treatment given by the defendant
[was] consistent with that reasonable degree of learning and skill usually possessed and
rendered by others of his profession ... having regard to the state of scientific learning at the
time." (emphasis added)); Tomer v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 368 A.2d 35, 38 (Conn. 1976)
("[T]he standard of care which was applicable to the doctors in the use of Halothane was
dependent upon the state of their art at the time that they were allegedly negligent." (emphasis
added) (citing Geraty v. Kaufman, 163 A. 33, 36 (Conn. 1932))); Adkins v. Ropp, 14 N.E.2d
727, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1938) ("In determining whether the physician or surgeon has exercised
the degree of care and skill which the law requires, regard must be had to the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment." (emphasis added)); Schwartz v. Goldstein, 508 N.E.2d
97, 99 (Mass. 1987) ("A doctor undertakes to use a reasonable degree of care such as ordinarily
possessed by others providing medical care and treatment, having regard to the current state of
care and treatment." (emphasis added) (quoting Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass.
1968) and Riggs v. Christie, 173 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1961))); Dietsch v. Mayberry, 47 N.E.2d
404, 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (recognizing physician's duty "to exercise the average degree of
skill, care, and diligence exercised by members of the same profession ... in the light of the
present state of medical and surgical science" (emphasis added) (quoting Gillette v. Tucker, 65
N.E. 865 (Ohio 1902))); King v. Ditto, 19 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1933) ("As a general rule, the
degree of care and skill depends somewhat upon... the advanced state of medical and surgical
science at time services to patient were rendered .... What might have been considered due
care twenty ears ago would be gross negligence to-day." (emphasis added)); Sinclair v. Haven,
89 P.2d 820, 822 (Wash. 1939) (stating reasonable skill and learning is "measured by the state
of medical and surgical science at the time the service is rendered" (emphasis added)).
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Nowatske v. Osterloh7 4 is more explicit in its pronouncement that
physicians have a duty to stay abreast of medical advances. The Nowatske
court stated, "[A] reasonably competent practitioner is one who keeps up with
advances in medical knowledge."' 75 In Nowatske, the plaintiff lost sight in his
right eye after the defendant performed scleral buckling to reattach the
plaintiff's retina. 7 6 The plaintiff brought a malpractice action that the trial
court dismissed.'77 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the circuit court's
malpractice instruction to the jury was inadequate because it equated the legal
standard of care with the custom of the medical profession without considering
whether such custom was sufficient in light of current medical science. 78 The
plaintiff argued that by not considering custom in light of current science, a
court would allow an unreasonable and outdated custom to shield clearly
negligent conduct from liability.' 79 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin limited
its review to the question of whether the standard jury instruction accurately
stated the law of negligence for medical malpractice cases.
80
In considering the validity of the plaintiff s argument, the Nowatske court
cited Gates v. Fleischer' for the proposition that the current state of science is
174. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. 1996).
175. Id. at 273.
176. Id. at 266.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 270. The jury instruction was as follows:
In treating Kim Nowatske, Dr. Osterloh was required to use the degree of care,
skill, and judgment which is usually exercised in the same or similar circumstances
by the average specialist who practices the specialty which Dr. Osterloh practices,
having due regard for the state of medical science at the time Kim Nowatske was
treated. The burden in this case is on the plaintiffs to prove that Dr. Osterloh failed
to conform to this standard.
Id. at 269-70.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 266.
181. Gates v. Fleischer, 30 N.W. 674 (Wis. 1886). In Gates, the plaintiffbrought an action
for damages allegedly caused by the defendant surgeon's malpractice in treating the plaintiff for
uterine trouble. Id. at 675. The defendant diagnosed the plaintiff as having uterine disease and
treated her by applying caustic to her cervical canal on the theory that there was uterine
ulceration. Id. Evidence suggested that plaintiff had no ulcers, that the use of caustic to treat
uterine ulcers was contrary to the advanced state of medical science at the time, and that even if
the use of caustic had been proper, defendant improperly applied such treatment. Id. at 674.
The trial court found for the plaintiff and awarded her $350 in damages. Id. at 675. On appeal,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury. Id.
The instruction was:
The defendant being a physician and surgeon, and as such called to prescribe for,
and professionally treat, the plaintiff, he was bound to bring to her aid and relief
such skill as is ordinarily possessed and used by physicians and surgeons in the
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a factor in the standard of care. 82 The Nowatske court then agreed with the
plaintiff's assertion "that should customary medical practice fail to keep pace
with developments and advances in medical science, adherence to custom
might constitute a failure to exercise reasonable care."'' 83 The court explained
further, "If what passes for customary or usual care lags behind developments
in medical science, such care might be negligent, despite its customary
nature." 184 The court next considered whether the jury instruction 185 accurately
conveyed the message "that reasonable care, skill and judgment are not
necessarily embodied by the customary practice of the profession but rather
represent the practice of physicians who keep abreast of advances in medical
knowledge."186 The court concluded that the instruction was sufficient because
the phrase "due regard for the state of medical science" accurately informed the
jury that the competent physician is one who stays abreast of the advanced state
of medical science.1
8 7
A few courts have gone beyond mere recitation of a duty to stay abreast to
actually hold physicians liable for negligence for not keeping up with the latest
medical science. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital'8 8 provides an example.
In Burton, the court considered imposing liability on a physician and hospital
for injuries plaintiff incurred due to prolonged liberal exposure of oxygen
following plaintiff's premature birth. 89 The physician and hospital argued that
they should escape liability because they had satisfied the standard of care by
practicing in accordance with conventional medical wisdom that considered
increased oxygen essential to the survival of premature babies.' 90 The Burton
court imposed liability because several studies had found that oxygen was
unnecessary and dangerous.' 9 '
vicinity or locality in which he resides, having regard to the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. See id. at 675 (stating that regard to advanced state of profession is one component of
standard of care).
183. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Wis. 1996).
184. Id.
185. See supra note 178 (quoting jury instruction, which is based on Wis JI-Civil 1023).
186. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 272-73.
187. Id. at 273 ("The phrase 'due regard for the state of medical science' tells the jury that
a reasonably competent practitioner is one who keeps up with advances in medical
knowledge.").
188. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
189. M
190. Id. at 879-80.
191. Id.
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By considering cases in which courts have held that physicians have a duty
to stay abreast of the latest science, one might posit that the duty to stay abreast is,
in effect, a duty to practice EBM. Burton bolsters the theory that the duties are
synonymous because the Burton court essentially held the physician and hospital
liable for not practicing in accordance with current best evidence.' 92 Aside from
Burton, whether or not a court would employ the duty to stay abreast to impose
liability for not practicing EBM is, at present, unclear. The confusion stems
mainly from the fact that the duty to stay abreast is largely an untested tool.
Examples of cases expressing the duty are far more frequent than cases turning on
it.' 93 In fact, the issue is rarely present in medical malpractice actions,194 let alone
determinative of liability. Additionally, courts have seldom been explicit in
proclaiming what the duty entails. 9' Unlike other professionals, physicians are
largely left in the dark as to what it means to stay abreast.' 96 This lack of certainty
takes on greater significance as medical science advances at an ever-increasing
pace. Scholars suggest that "[flailure to access [online medical] databases is
likely to become an important piece of evidence in a malpractice suit, since it is
evidence that a physician has failed to stay current in his or her field of
practice, '197 but when or how courts will focus on such evidence is unclear.
IV. Remedying the Incompatibility of Current Standard of Care
Analysis and EBM
Courts are cognizant of their role in altering tort law to reflect changes in
society. As the Supreme Court of Florida explained, "This Court has consistently
192. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining EBM).
193. Holder, supra note 168, at 1462 ("Very few decisions have dealt with the sole
question of whether or not a physician has been negligent simply because he did not use the
latest methods of treatment.").
194. Id. at 1461 ("Whether or not failure to keep abreast of new developments in medicine
or surgery alone can constitute a cause of action against a physician does not seem to have been
directly decided in many cases."); Noah, supra note 10, at 463 (noting that extent to which
physicians keep abreast is rarely litigated).
195. See supra note 173 (providing examples of formulations of duty to stay abreast). But
see John C. Peck & Wyatt A. Hoch, Liability of Engineers for Structural Design Errors: State
of The Art Considerations in Defining the Standard of Care, 30 VILL. L. REv. 403,430-31
(1985) (stating that one "court required physicians to read journals, solicit product data from
manufacturers' representatives, listen to tape record digests of current literature, and attend
postgraduate courses and professional seminars" (citing Pederson v. Dumouchal, 431 P.2d 973,
977-78 (1967))).
196. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (discussing attorney's duty to stay
abreast).
197. FuRRowETAL.,supra note 15, at 183.
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recognized its 'continuing responsibility to the citizens of this state' to
modernize traditional principles of tort law when such becomes necessary 'to
ensure that the law remains both fair and realistic as society and technology
change." ' 198 This Note argues that if courts are to modify tort law to ensure it
remains fair and realistic as the practice of medicine changes, they will need to
consider the double-edged incompatibility of their current standard of care
analysis and EBM. Today, a physician at the crossroads of a standard of care
dominated by custom and a duty to stay abreast of the latest science might not
know whether he is safe practicing EBM or whether he is obligated to practice
EBM. The prevalence of custom may say to physicians "you're damned if you
do;" whereas, the duty to stay abreast may say "you're damned if you don't."
This Part begins by suggesting that courts should clarify the duty to stay
abreast. This Part then considers frameworks to replace the custom-based
standard of care. Next, this Part contrasts the physician's standard of care with
care standards applied in other areas of law in order to draw instructive
parallels to inform the search for and evaluation of potential alterations to the
physician's standard of care in light of EBM. This Part presents four goals for
creating a standard of care that can co-exist with EBM and considers five
frameworks that may accommodate those goals. After evaluating each of these
frameworks, this Part concludes by recommending a modified custom-based or
modified CPG-based standard in the short-term and proposing a bifurcated
standard in the long-term.
A. Clarifying the Duty to Stay Abreast
This Note argues that in light of the information explosion in medicine,' 99
courts should clarify the duty to stay abreast. The current doctrine does little to
explain to a physician what he must do to keep up because courts define the
duty in vague terms and there is little case law to inform physicians of exactly
what it means to "stay abreast. ''200 The extent of the doctrine is also unclear
because courts originally formulated the duty to stay abreast long ago, when
medical knowledge was increasing at a much slower pace than it is today. At
that time, staying abreast entailed much less than it might today. Consideration
198. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Ins. Co. of N.
Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447,451 (Fla. 1984)); see also Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d
726, 736 (N.M. 1990) ("New Mexico has recognized that tort law is not static-it must expand
to recognize changing circumstances that our evolving society brings to our attention.").
199. See supra note 54 (explaining information explosion in medicine).
200. See supra Part I1I.D (discussing physician's duty to stay abreast).
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of the staggering increase in the number of medical journal articles in recent
years illustrates this point.20'
That is not to say that the duty to stay abreast should fall in the face of
rapid advances in medical science (such a paradox would belie the policy that
led to the rule in the first place), but rather that a vague duty to stay abreast may
need clarification to successfully alert physicians as to how to avoid liability in
the face of the momentous task of staying abreast with the fast-paced advances
in modem medicine. The current confusion over the extent of the duty to stay
abreast is evident in legal scholarship---one source proclaims that the "duty to
'keep abreast' ... would be more accurately labeled a duty to keep abreast of
customary medicalpractice, 002 while another suggests the duty to stay abreast,
in effect, demands "adherence to the state-of-the-art rather than simply existing
custom." 203  If the EBM movement continues to grow and effectuates a
"paradigm shift," as some commentators suggest it will,2°4 knowing which
statement is accurate will become much more important. In the interest of
serving the goal of clarity, this Note suggests that the prudent course for courts
to take is to begin sharpening and elucidating the extent of this duty.
B. Contrasting the Physician's Standard of Care with Other Areas of
Law
Before presenting potential frameworks for altering the medical
malpractice standard of care in light of EBM, it is helpful to briefly
consider three other areas of the law: the standard of care analysis used to
determine malpractice liability of attorneys; the use of evidence of the
state-of-the-art in products liability litigation; and the process-oriented
business judgment rule of corporate law. As is often the case when dealing
with uncharted areas of the law, reasoning by analogy aids the search for a
framework that can successfully co-exist with EBM. This Note contends
that lessons learned from these areas of law will help courts formulate an
appropriate framework for altering the physician's standard of care in light
of EBM.
201. See SACKETT ET AL., supra note 42, at 2 (noting exponential increase in number of
journal articles over past decade).
202. Kacmar, supra note 136, at 641.
203. Noah, supra note 10, at 463.
204. Id. at 374.
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1. Standards of Care for Non-Physician Professionals
An instructive parallel to consider is that between the law of
professional malpractice as it applies to physicians and as it applies to other
professionals. This Note will briefly compare liability determinations in
medical malpractice cases with those in cases involving attorneys. Whereas the
law has traditionally held physicians to a custom-based standard of care,205 it
has not treated attorneys the same way. Although sources sometimes state that
the attorney's standard of care is analogous to the physician's standard of
care, 206 in practice, the standard courts employ in legal malpractice actions
appears to be closer to an ordinary negligence standard than a custom-based
standard.20 7 Courts typically explain the attorney's duty as that of using
"reasonable care, diligence, and skill in the performance of his professional
duties. ',20 While custom is undoubtedly part of the analysis, it does not have
the primacy in legal malpractice that it does in medical malpractice. To
illustrate, consider how effective the following argument would be: "Your
honor, despite the fact that the legislature recently decreased the statute of
limitations for filing an action for [ j from five years to two years, the
custom has always been five years, therefore my failure to file on behalf of my
client within two years cannot be negligence."
The law of legal malpractice also differs from that of medical malpractice
in that the law holds attorneys to what appears to be a more pronounced duty to
stay abreast. Although courts have recognized a duty for physicians to stay
abreast of medical advances, as noted above, parties rarely litigate the issue,
and thus the threat to a physician for failing to keep up is minimal.2° On the
other hand, an attorney faces a very real possibility that liability will ensue if he
does not stay aware of the latest changes in the law. 210 Courts have explained
205. See supra Part lIL.B (discussing traditional custom-based standard of care for medical
malpractice).
206. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 254 n.50 (2002) (stating that attorneys are liable
to clients for negligence in same manner that physicians are liable to patients). The note
continues, "[A]ttorneys are required to exercise that degree of skill and diligence in their
profession which physicians and surgeons are required to exercise in theirs." Id. (citing Olson
v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934) (stating that same rules of law govern liability for negligence
and lack of professional skill and diligence in practice of law and in practice of medicine and
surgery)).
207. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining ordinary negligence standard).
208. 7A C.J.S., supra note 206, § 254.
209. See Noah, supra note 10, at 463 (stating parties rarely litigate issue of physician's
duty to stay abreast).
210. See Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect of the Information Age on
Physicians' Professional Liability, 36 DEPAUL L. Rv. 69, 92 (1986) (citing failure to
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the attorney's duty as that of "a specific duty to research '21 1 or "the duty of
diligent investigation and research. 21 2 An attorney must not only know "those
plain and elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well
informed attorneys21 3 but must also "discover those additional rules of law
which, although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard
research techniques."2 1 4 In this respect, the law of legal malpractice is arguably
a state-of-the-art standard, or at least more so than the law of medical
malpractice. As the legal community begins to consider what effect EBM
should have on the physician's standard of care, it may be useful to consider
whether courts should treat physicians more like attorneys.
2. Evidence of State-of-the-Art in Products Liability Litigation
Perhaps the most prominent legal use of evidence of the state-of-the-art
occurs in products liability cases asserting a design defect. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability states that a product is defective in design
"when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the
seller or other distributor... and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe. 2 1 1 In determining manufacturer liability for a
Shepardize as one way in which "an attorney's failure to keep abreast in law can easily result in
malpractice liability"); see also State v. Traeger, 29 P.3d 518, 525-26 (N.M. 2001) (noting that
practitioners have obligation to keep abreast of current changes in law); Frank v. Pepe, 717
N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (stating that attorney may be liable in malpractice for
failure to conduct adequate legal research, and quoting McCoy v. Tepper, 690 N.Y.S.2d 678,
679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)); Shopsin v. Siben & Siben, 702 N.Y.S.2d 610,612 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (same); Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating that
court does not expect attorney "to be infallible," but does expect him to conduct that degree of
research sufficient to enable client "to make an informed decision") (citing Collas v. Garnick,
624 A.2d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
211. See Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Estate of O'Connor, 248 F.3d 151, 173 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting that attorney, under New Jersey law, has specific duty to research, monitor, and advise
his clients about statutes of limitations).
212. See Rock v. ATPIC Trucking Co., 739 So. 2d 874, 879 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that attorney owes client "duty of diligent investigation and research"); Finkelstein v. Collier,
636 So. 2d 1053, 1058 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
213. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975) (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685
(Cal. 1961); Lally v. Kuster, 171 P. 961 (Cal. 1918); Floro v. Lawton, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1960); Sprague v. Morgan, 185 Cal. App. 2d 519, 523 (1960); Armstrong v. Adams, 283
P. 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929)).
214. Id.
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 2(1998) (defining categories
of product defect).
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design defect, courts may consider whether the manufacturer complied with the
state-of-theart. 216 The term "state-of-the-art" serves "as a label for the requirement
that [manufacturers use] the best scientific and medical technology that is practically
and economically feasible at the time the product was made or marketed. 21 7
The deternination of whether or not the defendant complied with the state-of-
the-art may involve consideration of industry customs. Generally, customs are
relevant, but courts recognize that customs may be outdated.21 8 Thus, a court in
some situations may impose liability for not using an alternative design even though
such altemative design is not custom. 219 The burden is on the plaintiff to prove a
defective design.220 The burden is on the defendant to prove that the state-of-the-art
and other factors justify marketing the product.221 Compliance with state-of-the-art
is not necessarily dispositive, as other factors are also relevant.
222
3. Judgmental Immunity in Corporate Law
In corporate law, the business judgment rule operates to shield corporate
directors from liability resulting from decisions they make as long as the directors
216. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 128, at 753 ("Most jurisdictions allow state of the
art evidence to be considered in the determination of design defect, either by case law or
statute." (citing CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(I)(a) (1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2)
(Michie 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (West 1986); Beech v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 584 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1991); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979);
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983))).
217. See id. (defining "state-of-the-art").
218. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983) (noting that while
industry customs may be relevant to design defect determinations, customs are not determinative
since they may lag behind technological development).
219. See id. ("A manufacturer may have a duty to make products pursuant to a safer design
even if the custom of the industry is not to use that alternative.").
220. See Gawenda v. Werner Co., 932 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (explaining
that under Michigan law, plaintiff has burden to establish, through risk-utility analysis, that
manufacturer's design choice renders product defective and that safer, alternative design was
available); Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439,442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating
that in products liability actfon alleging design defect, plaintiff has burden to prove feasible
design alternatives existed).
221. See Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 519 (N.J. 2000) (stating that when
defendant contends that plaintiff's suggested alternative design was unfeasible, defendant has
burden of proving state-of-the-art at time of manufacturer).
222. See Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991 ) ("Although state of the art evidence may be dispositive on the facts of a particular case, it
does not constitute an absolute defense apart from its appearance as one of the components of
balancing risk with utility factors.").
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were reasonably informed,22 a not operating under a conflict of interest, 224 and
reasonably believed they were acting pursuant to the best interests of the
corporation.225 In light of the business judgment rule, courts do not evaluate
directorial decisions against a standard of care.226 Instead, courts apply a
standard of care "to the process by which the directors 'become informed' in
connection with making the decision. 0 27  In other words, "the due care
standard in corporate law is applied to the decisionmaking process and not to its
result. 2 8 This standard differs from a standard of ordinary prudence because,
"[e]ven though a decision made or a result reached is not that of the
hypothetical ordinarily prudent person, no liability will attach as long as the
decisionmaking process meets the standard."
2 29
The Official Comment to the revised Model Business Corporation Act
§ 8.31 explains the rationale behind the business judgment rule. It notes,
The courts recognize that boards of directors and corporate managers make
numerous decisions that involve the balancing of risks and benefits for the
enterprise. Although some decisions turn out to be unwise or the result of a
mistake of judgment, it is not reasonable to reexamine an unsuccessful
decision with the benefit of hindsight.230
Scholars further explain the rationale behind the business judgment rule
by noting assertions that courts do not possess the expertise to make complex
business decisions.231 The business judgment rule and its supporting rationale
suggest that courts will never impose liability on directors who followed the
appropriate process in coming to such a decision. Although directorial liability
under the business judgment rule is mainly process-based, courts will impose
liability in spite of satisfactory process if the substance of a decision is not
rational.232
223. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1(a)(2)(ii)(B) (1984).
224. Id. at § 8.3 1(a)(2)(iii).
225. Id.at § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(A).
226. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 762 (7th ed. 200 1).
227. Id.
228. Charles Hansen, The ALl Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care
and the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAW 1237, 1241 (1986).
229. Id.
230. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31 official cmt. (1984).
231. See Arkes & Shipani, supra note 46, at 622 (explaining rationales given to justify the
business judgment rule).
232. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667,699 (N.Y. 1940) (imposing liability on bank
directors due to fact that no sound reason supported their actions). The Litwin court notes that
"[T]here is more here than a question of business judgment as to which men might differ. The
directors plainly failed in this instance to bestow the care which the situation demanded." Id.
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C. Frameworks for Altering Standard of Care Analysis in Light of EBM
As the legal community begins to consider appropriate legal responses to
the growing prominence of EBM in the medical community, several options
may emerge, as courts could employ various frameworks to analyze standard of
care issues in light of EBM. This Note considers five possibilities ranging from
modification of the traditional custom-based standard to a bifurcation of the
standard of care into procedural and substantive components. Each of these
options presents different positive and negative aspects, which this Note
discusses below. To be sure, a myriad of other options are available, limited
only by the bounds ofjudicial innovation. This Note does not intend to present
an exhaustive list, but rather to present an exemplary range of alternatives.
Before considering each of these frameworks in turn, it is helpful to
identify some goals that an appropriate framework should advance. This Note
suggests that an appropriate framework should promote clarity, ease of
application, dynamism, and avoid the problems of over- and under-
inclusiveness. Clarity benefits physicians by informing them of the standard
with which to comply. Ease of application benefits courts, juries, and litigants
by facilitating resolution of malpractice actions. Dynamism ensures that the
law adjusts to "changes and improvements in medical science."233  The
avoidance of the problems of over- and under-inclusiveness, which loom
behind all law-making efforts, entails tailoring the law as closely as possible to
hold neither too many nor too few defendants accountable.
1. Modified Custom-Based Standard
One way to alter standard of care analysis in light of EBM is by modifying
the traditional custom-based standard. Although potentially endless ways to
modify this standard exist, this Note focuses on two modifications-moving
toward a reasonable physician standard, and incorporating risk-utility (or cost-
benefit) analysis. Essentially, these are the modifications Patricia Danzon
advocates, although Danzon's suggestions predated EBM.234 Danzon statesthat the complexity of medical malpractice requires that custom remain part of
233. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996) (quoting Brief for
Defendant at 18). In considering the appropriateness of the jury instruction at issue in the case,
the Nowatske court agrees with the defendant and an amicus brief of the State Medical Society
of Wisconsin that thejury instruction requires that custom be dynamic in order to be reasonable.
Id. at 271-72.
234. See DANZON, supra note 124, at 149 (advocating reasonable-man test or explicit cost-
benefit analysis).
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the analysis. She asserts, "Because of the complexity of the issues in medical
malpractice cases, there is no practical alternative to customary norms as the
standard of due care. '"235 However, she suggests that "courts should retain the
right to override custom in specific cases in favor of a reasonable-man test or an
explicit cost-benefit calculus.
2 36
Shifting the medical malpractice standard of care towards an ordinary
negligence standard would ameliorate rigid adherence to custom. Under this
approach, custom remains important as evidence of reasonable care, but it is not
conclusive. Courts may choose to follow the examples of Colorado and
Nevada, where evidence of custom establishes a rebuttable presumption of
reasonability.237 A party would have an opportunity to rebut this presumption
"simply by offering expert testimony establishing that the prevailing custom is
deficient. "238 The jury then decides whether the custom was reasonable and
allocates liability accordingly.
239
This modification brings the standard in line with what Justice Holmes
and Judge Hand advocated.24°  It bases liability determinations on
reasonableness, which includes consideration of what physicians ought to do,
rather than what they actually do. In this manner, this framework serves to
limit problems of over- and under-inclusiveness that might be present in a
purely custom-based framework. That is, this modification frees up courts from
having to hold every physician who deviates from custom liable and from
having to exonerate every physician who follows custom. Also, this
modification of the custom-based standard, like the custom-based standard
itself, provides ease of administration because courts are familiar with judging
individuals by standards of reasonable prudence.24' Moreover, another
advantage of this approach is that courts may be moving toward employing this
type of standard. 42
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See Peters, supra note 49, at 175 ("[C]ustomary standards continue to benefit from a
rebuttable presumption of reasonability in Colorado and Nevada.").
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (noting concerns of Justice Holmes
and Judge Hand over role of custom in determining standard of care).
241. See DANZON, supra note 124, at 139 ("In most cases of personal liability, the
courts... use the... 'reasonable and prudent man' standard.").
242. See Peters, supra note 49, at 187-88 (arguing that courts are shifting away from
custom-based standard in favor of ordinary negligence standard).
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Modifying the custom-based standard to incorporate cost-benefit or risk-
utility analysis into the standard of care evaluation might involve not only
consideration of customary practice, but also consideration of the costs, risks,
and benefits of alternatives. Courts could employ the United States v. Carroll
Towing Co.243 formula to determine when deviation from custom is
appropriate.244 In Carroll Towing, Judge Learned Hand defined negligence as
failing to take precautions whose costs do not exceed the potential loss
multiplied by the probability of that loss. 245 Under this framework, courts
would hold physicians liable for not practicing EBM to the extent that not
doing so violates Hand's negligence formula. Essentially, this standard would
look like the one employed in Helling v. Carey.
246
Presumably, this modification would be easy to administer, as courts have
employed the Hand negligence formula for over half a century. This
modification might also avoid the problems of over- and under-inclusiveness in
the same manner as the previous modification. Additionally, both of these
modifications could improve standard of care evaluations in light of EBM by
reducing the chilling effects that an unmodified custom-based standard places
on physicians desiring to disregard customary practice. However, to the extent
that custom remains central to the analysis in each, both modifications are
susceptible to criticism. As long as custom remains vital to standard of care
determinations, such determinations will lack a certain degree of dynamism.
243. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947). In Carroll
Towing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether a barge
owner should be partially responsible for losses incurred when its barge sank after a tug boat
struck the barge thereby causing it to break free of its mooring line. Id. at 171. The owner of
the lost cargo, the United States, sought compensation for its cargo, and the owner of the barge,
Conners Co., sought compensation for the barge. Id. The defendant, Carroll Towing, argued
that it should not be responsible for the entire loss because the loss of the vessel and its cargo
would not have occurred if there had been a bargee on board at the time. Id. In considering the
validity of the defendant's argument, Judge Learned Hand defined the owner's duty to protect
against resulting injuries as a function of three variables: (1) the probability that the barge
would break free; (2) the magnitude of resulting injuries if it does; and (3) the burden of taking
adequate precautions. Id. at 173. Judge Hand restated the idea in algebraic form: "[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL." Id. Scholars refer to this
formulation as the Learned Hand negligence formula.
244. See id. at 173 (defining duty to provide against resulting injuries as product of three
variables).
245. Id.; see also DANZON, supra note 124, at 139 ("[A] defendant is negligent if the loss
caused by the accident, multiplied by the probability of the accident's occurring, exceeds the
cost of preventing the accident.").
246. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing Helling v. Carey).
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 479 (2004)
2. Clinical Practice Guidelines Standard
Another framework could employ CPGs as measures of the standard of
care. Such a framework would advance EBM at least to the extent that the
CPGs employed are evidence-based. Scholars, legislatures, and courts seem to
encourage this framework. 247 But, even ifjudicial treatment of EBM is limited
to CPGs, difficult questions remain as to how to use CPGs.248 For example,
some scholars disagree over whether CPGs should be available to both sides in
a dispute, or to only the plaintiff or to only the defendant. 249 Additionally,
regardless of whether courts allow one or both sides to use CPGs, the question
of how courts should weigh them remains. As noted above, so far judicial
treatment of CPGs has been inconsistent.5 °
Courts could use CPGs to help establish a standard of care in several
ways. 251 For example, courts could allow guidelines to establish the standard of
care conclusively. By allowing guidelines to conclusively establish the
standard of care, courts would in effect allow guidelines to take the place of
custom as the benchmark of the standard of care. Practicing in accordance with
a CPG would preclude liability just as practicing in accord with custom.
252
247. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 337 (suggesting that courts should use CPGs as they use
custom). Rosoff notes:
The most obvious possibility for the use of CPGs, then, is that a court could look to
them as evidence of what is customary practice in the medical profession. A
physician who practiced in conformity with a CPG would be shielded from liability
to the same extent as one who could establish that she or he followed professional
custom. Conversely, a physician's failure to conform to a recognized guideline
could raise an inference that she or he did not perform up to the required standard;
at the least, it would obligate the physician to explain why the CPG was not
followed.
Id.
248. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 180 ("Clinical guidelines raise difficult legal
questions, since they potentially offer an authoritative and settled statement of what the standard
of care should be for a given treatment or illness.").
249. See Hirshfeld, supra note 56, at 2887 (noting frequent recommendations that CPGs
should be available for use by physicians to defend against malpractice claims, but should not
be available to plaintiffs to establish liability).
250. See Rosoff, supra note 2 1, at 335 (explaining spare and inconsistent judicial response
to CPGs).
251. See FuRROW ET AL., supra note 15, at 180 (noting courts have several choices when
parties offer CPGs into evidence).
252, See id. ("A doctor practicing in conformity with a guideline would be shielded from
liability to the same extent as one who can establish that she or he followed professional
custom."). The authors explain that the guideline under this approach "acts like an authoritative
expert witness or a well-accepted review article." Id. In addition to using guidelines as
evidence of customary practice, courts could allow parties to use guidelines to establish a
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As noted above, scholars believe that CPGs may serve the goal of
clarifying the tort standard of care. 3 Arguably, there is no better method of
clarifying the standard of care than allowing CPGs to serve as codified
standards of care. Such an approach would also offer ease of administration.
The standard of care would be predetermined, and a court would simply need to
ascertain whether the defendant violated it. Such a framework might also
eliminate under- and over-inclusiveness by only holding physicians liable for
violating the letter of the CPG.
On the surface, this fi-amework has a great deal of appeal. However, two
questions remain: Is it practical and is it wise? As to the first question,
scholars criticize the use of CPGs to conclusively establish the standard of care
as a threat to standard of care analysis. 2 4 One problem with using guidelines as
conclusive evidence of the standard of care is that often no established
guideline will exist.25 5 Conversely, problems could arise when conflicting
guidelines exist. This situation is not as rare as one might expect.2' 6 Thus, in
the absence of an authoritative standard setting body, this framework may
actually do little to advance the goal of clarity, or, for that matter, ease of
administration.25 7 Consider the difficulty that a court might face when
presented with conflicting guidelines. In that situation, the battle of the experts
respectable minority approach. See id. ("A guideline could also serve as evidence of a
,respectable' minority practice." (citing Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in
Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 289 (1996))).
253. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that scholars see use of CPGs as
important reform to clarify tort standard of care).
254. See Sokol & Molzen, supra note 167, at 484 (suggesting that arbitrarily designating
guidelines as consensus of profession poses "tremendous threat" to standard of care analysis);
see also Jacobson & Kanna, supra note 129, at 316. Jacobsen & Kanna assert:
As Rosoff(1995) and others have argued (Brennan 1991), it is unlikely that courts
will rely solely on guidelines to set the standard of care but will allow the jury to
weigh them as one piece of evidence in determining liability. Given the physician
judgment inherent in any clinical situation, the potential multiplicity of competing
and conflicting guidelines, the usual lack of uncertainty inherent in the guidelines
development process, and direct physician testimony, it is improbable that any
guideline will suffice to set the standard of care.
Id.
255. See FuRRow, supra note 15, at 178 ("A national standard of practice does not exist for
many procedures and tools, and the 'highest and best' practice may not be the safest or most
effective in the long run.").
256. See Arkes & Schipani, supra note 46, at 632 (noting that "multiple guidelines exist on
the same topic").
257. See Rosoff, supra note 21, at 355-66 (arguing for creation of authoritative standard
setting body).
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may simply become the battle of the guidelines, with no one the wiser.258 Noah
cites two cases in which such battles occurred. 259 Therefore, even if advocates
are correct that this framework may advance objectives of clarifying tort law
and perhaps lowering costs, it likely will not succeed if the suggested use of
guidelines is to conclusively establish the standard of care.
Additional problems arise because many existing guidelines are
consensus-based.260 One source defines clinical practice guidelines as "sets of
suggestions, described in decision rules, based on current medical
consensus." 26' If guidelines are merely codifications of custom, would shifting
the standard of care from one based on custom to one based on guidelines make
any difference? Additionally, even if it is prudent to use CPGs as conclusive
evidence of the standard of care, many guidelines will not be available for this
purpose, as they may be subject to disclaimers undermining their use in
litigation.262 Another argument against simply using a clinical practice
guideline as the standard of care is that a guideline cannot prescribe the correct
treatment in every instance because every patient is unique.2 63
258. See Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard
ofCare: Bridging Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 821, 853
(2002) ("[T]he likely outcome of widespread reliance on practice guidelines would be the
supplementation of the traditional battle of the experts with a new 'battle of the guidelines."').
259. See Noah, supra note 10, at 462 ("In at least two cases the parties engaged in a battle
of the guidelines where different organizations had made conflicting recommendations about the
appropriate frequency for breast cancer screening." (citing Kramer v. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157,
158-59 (III. App. Ct. 1994); Levine v. Rosen, 616 A.2d 623, 628 (Pa. 1993); Mark Crane,
Clinical Guidelines: A Malpractice Safety Net?, MED. ECON., Apr. 12, 1999, at 236, 239-40;
Nancy Volkers, NCIReplaces Guidelines with Statement of Evidence, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
14 (1994))).
260. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (distinguishing evidence- and consensus-
based guidelines).
261. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 179 (defining "clinical practice guidelines").
262. See id. at 180-81 (recognizing limitations on use of guidelines as conclusive evidence
of standard of care because of disclaimers). The authors explain this problem as follows:
Professional societies often attach disclaimers to their guidelines, thereby
undercutting their defensive use in litigation. The American Medical Association,
for instance, calls its guidelines "parameters" instead of protocols to indicate a large
sphere of physician discretion, and further suggests that all guidelines contain
disclaimers stating that they are not intended to displace physician discretion. Such
guidelines therefore cannot be treated as conclusive.
Id.
263. See Sokol & Molzen, supra note 1 67, at 489 ("Outcome-based studies, formularies,
clinical pathways, and managed care guidelines will not determine the best care for every patient
and the legal liability standard ought not be premised on such an assumption.").
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Practicality aside, this Note argues that this framework is not wise because
it is not dynamic. EBM encourages the use of "current best evidence."2'6 As
noted above, while CPGs might reflect current best evidence when written,
advances in medical science might quickly render them obsolete.2 6' The lack of
dynamism inherent in codifying the standard of care according to CPGs could
perpetuate inconsistencies between standard of care analysis and EBM, and
thus precludes total satisfaction with this framework. As one source explains,
"[G]uidelines may have the effect of freezing the standard of care, thereby
discouraging further research and innovation in areas about which the experts
have reached a consensus., 266 Thus, in order for the law "to promote genuine
EBM, however, the courts will have to do more than simply latch on to clinical
practice guidelines. 
267
3. Modified Clinical Practice Guidelines Standard
Recognizing the above-mentioned problems with using CPGs to
conclusively establish the standard of care, a court may prefer a modified CPG
framework. Instead of using guidelines as conclusive evidence of the standard
of care, an arguably wiser course is to use guidelines as raising a rebuttable
presumption of negligence. 261 Thus, this framework would use CPGs as
evidence of the standard of care just as the modified custom-based standard
would use custom, as CPGs could take the place of custom in establishing a
rebuttable presumption of due care.269
This approach remedies the lack of dynamism of the CPG standard by
unfreezing the standard of care. CPGs remain significant, but not conclusive.
This framework may be analogous to an attorney's duty to stay abreast.270 The
analogy is as follows: attorneys must know the law as written by the legislature
and as interpreted by the courts; similarly, physicians should know the
recommendations of CPGs and how other evidence alters those
recommendations. A statute may reflect common law at the time of its
264. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining EBM).
265. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that CPGs become quickly
outdated).
266. Noah, supra note 10, at 425.
267. Id. at 463.
268. See FuRRow ET AL., supra note 15, at 180 (noting that courts could use guidelines to
raise rebuttable presumptions).
269. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (suggesting modifying custom-based
standard to use custom to establish rebuttable presumption of standard of care).
270. See supra notes 209-13 (discussing attorney's duty to stay abreast).
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codification, but the law will continually evolve as courts interpret it through
cases. Previously formulated doctrine provides a baseline for the attorney, but
he must stay current. Similarly, CPGs reflect current best evidence at the time
that professional associations promulgate them. Advances in medical science
may interpret, develop, or "over-turn" these CPGs. Thus, perhaps in light of
EBM, courts should treat doctors like they treat attorneys and impose a stricter
duty to stay abreast.27'
Because of the problems cited with the CPG standard, it would be
imprudent for a court to begin "demanding lockstep adherence to any particular
CPG. '2 72 A court should nevertheless "expect that, if a medically reasonable
CPG suggests conduct from which the physician has deviated, the physician
should be able to explain that deviation with something more than a flat
assertion that 'in my professional judgment, the guideline did not apply.0'
2 73
Scholars suggest that use of CPGs in this manner is more likely than use of
CPGs as conclusive statements of the standard of care.274 For example, Noah
states, "Although it seems unwise to treat such guidelines as definitive on
questions of physician negligence, especially given the many limitations
discussed previously, they can provide valuable evidence about the standard of
care to which physicians should aspire.
2 75
4. State-of-the-Art Standard
Although it may sound illogical to suggest a move to the state-of-the-art
for medical malpractice law, it is important to note that at least one scholar has
suggested that this is essentially what the traditional duty to stay abreast
represents. Noah states that courts that insist that physicians stay abreast of
"the latest clinically-relevant research in their fields" are "in effect demanding
adherence to the state-of-the-art rather than simply existing custom." 276 Noah
explains further, "As true in products liability cases, courts do not demand that
physicians take into account unknowable information, but the failure to conduct
271. See supra notes 209-13 (suggesting courts hold attorneys to stricter duty to stay
abreast).
272. Morreim, supra note 66, at 422.
273. Id.
274. See supra note 254 (criticizing the use of guidelines to establish the standard of care).
275. Noah, supra note 10, at 463 (citing Mello, supra note 68, at 708-10); see also Arnold
J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX
369, 377-91 (1995); Sheila R. Shulman, Clinical Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Law:
An Evolving Standard of Care, 46 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 97, 105-06 (1991)).
276. Noah, supra note 10, at 463.
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a literature search may provide the basis for a malpractice claim. ',2 77 As noted
above, courts have rarely used this duty to find physicians liable.278  But,
perhaps now that the medical community is moving toward adherence to the
state-of-the-art through EBM, it is appropriate for the law to mandate such
adherence.
By suggesting a move to the state-of-the-art, this Note does not
recommend strict liability. Courts have previously rejected the application of
the doctrine of strict liability to the performance of medical services.279 Hoven
v. Kelble280 is one of a number of cases noting that the rule of strict liability
does not apply to the rendition of medical services. 8 ' In Hoven, a patient and
his wife sought to recover damages for injuries that the patient incurred during
a lung biopsy. 2  The complaint alleged ten causes of action against three
defendants-the surgeon, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital where the
biopsy was performed.283  Three causes of action, one for each of the
aforementioned defendants, advanced a strict liability theory based on defective
medical services.2 84  The Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, sustained
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. See supra notes 193-94 (discussing infrequency of finding liability based on duty to stay
abreast).
279. See Budding v. SSM Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678,682 (Mo. 2000) (stating that strict
products liability is not applicable to health care providers and overruling Bell v. Poplar Bluff
Physicians Group, 879 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Brandon v. Southeast Mo. Hosp., Inc.,
926 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Pinkerton v. Southeast Mo. Hosp. Ass'n, 926 S.W.2d 137
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996); and Mulligan v. Truman Med. Ctr., 950 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997));
see also David B. Harrison, Annotation, Application ofRule of Strict Liability in Tort to Person or
Entity Rendering Medical Services, 100 A.L.R.3d 1205, 1210 (1980) (discussing doctrine ofstrict
liability with regards to rendition of professional medical services).
280. Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
281. See id. at 392 (stating that "[a]lthough there may be general dissatisfaction with our
present tort medical injury compensation system, moving from the malpractice concept--even with
its many problenms-to a strict liability system at the present time appears to be a dubious move");
see also, e.g., Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 390-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that
courts may not impose strict liability to find medical doctor liable if injury results but plaintiffdoes
not establish negligence or fault); Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding strict liability inapplicable in action against physician who supplies product to patient
when physician could not perform medical services without product and when predominant
purpose of transaction was provision of medical services); Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671,
675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to apply strict liability to physicians); Black v. Gundersen
Clinic, Ltd., 448 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that Wisconsin courts do not
recognize cause of action in strict liability for physician's misrepresentation).
282. Hoven, 256 N.W.2d at 379.
283. Id. at380-81.
284. The complaint stated the strict liability cause of action against the anesthesiologist as
follows:
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defendants' demurrers on the strict liability claims, and on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that the doctrine of strict liability is not applicable to
the rendition of medical services."' 5
As the court explained, the essence of the plaintiffs' theory was "if a
plaintiff could show that a hypothetical virtually perfectly informed doctor,
working in a perfectly equipped hospital, could have avoided the untoward
result, the plaintiff could recover, notwithstanding that the defendants exercised
reasonable care in all respects. ', 28 6 The court explained further, "If attainment
of the goal, or avoidance of the maloccurrence is possible, then failure to attain
the goal or to avoid the maloccurence renders the service defective." 2 7 In
rejecting the plaintiffs' theory, the court noted that some cases have applied
strict liability outside the context of products liability.8 8 The court also noted
that courts in other jurisdictions have permitted recovery on the basis of strict
liability or implied warranty for the rendition of "defective services," when the
services were "of a relatively routine or simple nature." 28 9 But, when the cases
involve "professional services," courts have uniformly required the plaintiffs to
show negligence.290 In addition to finding no authority for imposing strict
29. That Kelble is and was at the time of this occurrence a seller engaged in the
business of selling medical services and at all times relevant hereto held himself out
as a seller of the specialty medical service of anesthesiology.
30. That the medical services rendered by Kelble were expected to and did reach
the plaintiff without substantial change in the condition when rendered.
31. That the medical services rendered by Kelble were defective when so rendered.
32. That the defects in said services were the cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, losses
and damages.
Id. at 381 n.2. The court notes that this statement of the cause of action against the
anesthesiologist is representative of those against the other two noninsurer defendants. Id.
285. Id. at 379.
286. Id. at 387.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 387-88.
289. Id. at 388 (citing Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767 (Ala. 1963); Buckeye
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Hill v. Polar
Pantries, 64 S.E.2d 885 (S.C. 1951)).
290. See id. (citing LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968)
(concluding that neither implied warranty nor strict liability should apply to professional
services)); Stuart v. Crestview Mut. Water Co., I10 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(denying strict liability for defective engineering services); Allied Props. v. John A. Blume &
Assoc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (same); Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 295 A.2d
363 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1972) (permitting recovery based on doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for
injuries sustained during plastic surgery, but stating that neither implied warranty nor strict
liability applied to medical or dental professions); Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967), affd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1968), afd 250 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1969) (stating that plaintiff could not recover against
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liability to the rendition of professional medical services, the court expressed
concern that adoption of the plaintiff's theory "would set the standard of
performance for the entire medical profession at the zenith of that profession's
achievement, a level at which by definition virtually no one could perform all
the time. 291 Under such a standard, "[t]hat which might possibly have been
done would be required, or liability would result, and inevitably, the matter
would be judged with the acuity of vision which hindsight provides."
2 92
Obviously, a move to a standard determined by the zenith of medical
achievement would be unwise if for no other reason than for the fact that such a
standard would be over-inclusive, imposing liability on all but the "hypothetical
virtually perfectly informed doctor[s], working in [] perfectly equipped
hospital[s]."293 Instead of suggesting strict liability, this framework could
effectuate a higher standard of care than a custom-based standard, one that
reflects the latest medical science but stops short of strict liability.294 This
framework would require a court to apply the same analysis that it would in a
products liability case when determining whether or not liability ensues from
compliance or noncompliance with the state-of-the-art.295 A defendant would
be able to show compliance with the state-of-the-art at the time of the diagnosis
or treatment in question. Just as customs are relevant in products liability
cases, 296 here too, customs, or CPGs would be relevant to establishing the state-
of-the-art. Also as in products cases, courts would recognize that customs may
be outdated 297 and would have the ability to impose a duty to use an alternative
method of diagnosis or treatment even if it was not the custom. The burden
would be on the plaintiff to prove a defective diagnosis or treatment. The
dentist based on strict liability for injuries suffered when hypodermic needle used to inject local
anesthetic broke while in plaintiff's jaw due to no fault of dentist); Hoover v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 528 P.2d 76 (Or. 1974) (refusing to apply strict liability to defendant's installation
of wheel); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (concluding strict liability
inapplicable to optometrist's fitting of contact lenses). The court goes on to state, "We have
found no decision of any court applying strict liability to the rendition of professional medical
services." Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 388-89 (Wis. 1977).
291. Hover, 256 N.W.2d at 387.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. For a similar proposal regarding liability of engineers, see Peck & Hoch, supra note
195, at 406 (advocating higher standard of care for engineers "that reflects advances in
knowledge and design theory but that stops short of strict liability").
295. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing state-of-the-art in products liability litigation).
296. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing role of custom in design defect
cases).
297. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing role of custom in design defect
cases).
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burden would be on the defendant to prove the state-of-the-art and other factors
to justify the treatment given. Proof of compliance with the state-of-the-art
would not be dispositive, as courts could consider other factors as relevant.
Arguments against this framework might echo the policy reasons the
Hoven court cited for refusing to extend the doctrine of strict liability as the
plaintiffs advocate. Not only does the court find no advancement of any social
policy to be made by extending strict liability to medical services, 298 it also
notes potentially deleterious effects, such as deterring doctors from treating
patients, especially in experimental ways.299 Hoven also expresses concerns




Perhaps the most radical method of incorporating EBM into the standard
of care would be to bifurcate the standard of care determination into substantive
and procedural analyses. Recall the commonly cited definition of EBM: "the
conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making
decisions about the care of individual patients. 0'0 Conceptually, EBM has two
components--one procedural and one substantive. The procedural component
is "the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use" of current best evidence. The
substantive component is "current best evidence." Recognizing these two
components, courts could bifurcate their standard of care determinations by
employing a process-oriented standard to judge the procedural aspects of a
physician's decision and by using any of the aforementioned frameworks to
judge the appropriateness of the substantive aspects of a physician's decision.
298. See Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 389 (Wis. 1977) ("To hold medical
professionals strictly liable under these circumstances would not promote any social benefit.").
299. See id. (suggesting that applying strict liability to physicians might make them
reluctant to assume responsibility for treatment of patients, particularly when treatment involves
new area of medicine).
300. Id. at 391. The court explains:
Medical services are an absolute necessity to society, and they must be readily
available to the people. It is said that strict liability will inevitably increase the cost
for medical services, which might make them beyond the means of many
consumers, and that imposition of strict liability might hamper progress in
developing new medicines and medical techniques.
Id.
301. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (defining EBM).
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The analogy of the way courts could adjudicate liability with regards to the
process-based component is to judicial treatment of actions of corporate
directors under the business judgment rule.302  Although many legal
commentators have compared the medical malpractice standard of care to the
business judgment rule,303 none has focused on the impact of EBM on the
medical standard outside of the context of CPGs. As noted above, the business
judgment rule operates to shield corporate directors from liability resulting from
decisions they make as long as the directors were reasonably informed, not
operating under a conflict of interest, and as long as they objectively believed
their decisions were in the best interest of the corporation. 3°4 There is no
similar shield in medical malpractice law. To be sure, the law has long held
that a mere error in judgment is not sufficient to impose liability on a
physician.30 5 But, the law has not insulated physician's decisions to the same
extent that it has insulated those of corporate directors. Perhaps EBM will
provide an impetus to begin insulating physician decisions as long as the
process by which physicians make decisions is appropriate. Recall that one
rationale for the business judgment rule is that courts are presumably ill-
equipped to understand the complexities underlying business decisions.30 6 Are
not courts similarly ill-equipped to understand the complexities underlying
decisions based on EBM?
Functionally, the process-based component of a bifurcated framework
might involve judging a physician's decisionmaking process against the steps
of EBM. °7 If a physician makes a decision on a diagnosis or treatment
according to EBM, then a court would not impose liability. Of course, like the
business judgment rule, this standard should maintain a requirement of
substantive reasonability.308 Courts could measure the substantive reasonability
of a physician's decision by employing any of the abovementioned frameworks.
302. See supra Part IV.B.3. (discussing business judgment rule).
303. See, e.g., Arkes & Schipani, supra note 46, at 587 (considering parallels between
medical malpractice standard of care and business judgment rule); Joseph H. King, Jr.,
Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of Care in Medical
Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 49 (1999) (same); O'Connell & Boutros, supra note 63 (same).
304. See supra notes 223-25 (explaining business judgment rule).
305. See Staloch v. Holm, 11l N.W. 264,266 (Minn. 1907) (noting that a physician "is not
ordinarily liable for damages consequent upon an honest mistake or an error of judgment").
306. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (citing assertions that courts do not have
expertise to make complex business decisions).
307. See supra notes 116-19 (describing steps involved in practice of EBM).
308. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting that even under business judgment
rule decisions must be substantively rational).
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While a move toward a bifurcated standard of care might not make sense
as courts begin to grapple with determining how to alter the medical
malpractice standard of care in light of EBM, as EBM acquires more adherents,
it may provide the best course. Unlike a traditional, custom-based standard of
care, a bifurcated standard encourages physicians to practice EBM by removing
the threat of liability for deviating from accepted practice as long as the
physician follows the appropriate procedures in coming to a decision.
Nevertheless, it leaves courts able to impose liability when decisions are so
substantively bad as to be irrational.
V. Conclusion
EBM has great potential to transform medicine and improve patient care.
Undoubtedly, as medical science continues to advance, physicians will learn
that more widely accepted practices are inefficacious or even harmful.3 09
However, as explicated above, EBM is not without detractors.310 Additionally,
not all, or even most physicians currently practice EBM.311 One scholar
explains that "there is sufficient evidence to suggest that most clinicians'
practices do not reflect the principles of evidence-based medicine but rather are
based upon tradition, their most recent experience, what they learned years ago
in medical school, or what they have heard from their friends.3 1 2 If this
statement were to forever hold true, continuing to judge physician liability by a
custom-based standard of care would make sense. But, EBM is a recent
movement, and indicators suggest it is gaining steam.
3 13
309. See Eddy, supra note 40, at 396 (noting that new studies constantly show inefficacy or
harm of accepted practices). Eddy states:
New studies continually reveal that practices that were once accepted without doubt
can turn out to be worthless or even harmful. We were wrong about
diethylstilbestrol, radical mastectomies, erythropoetin for anemia in end-stage renal
disease, hyponatremic encephalopathy, treatment of ingested poisons, hormone
replacement therapy for heart disease, and class I anti-arrhythmics for heart attacks.
Experts from top universities with the most experience testified under oath that
high-dose chemotherapy for late-stage breast cancer would produce 20 to 30
percent long-term cure rates. Randomized control trials later proved them wrong.
Id.
310. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text (noting criticisms of EBM).
311. See Noah, supra note 10, at 377 ("As it turns out, we already have evidence-based
medicines, but we most certainly do not yet enjoy fully evidence-based medical practice.").
312. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 369-70.
313. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which EBM has
altered medicine).
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As EBM acquires more adherents, the legal community must consider if
the current standard of care analysis is compatible. If and when EBM
effectuates a "paradigm shift" in medicine," 4 that is, as more and more
physicians move toward making decisions based on high-grade scientific
evidence rather than custom, custom will become a less valuable indicator of
good medical practice. While it is unlikely that EBM will become the norm in
the near-term, the legal community should take notice now315 and begin to
consider appropriate alterations to the medical malpractice standard of care.
Whatever changes are made should result in a standard of care that
successfully co-exists with EBM. Courts may eventually decide to impose a
duty to practice EBM, either on its own or by employing the duty to stay
abreast. But at the very least courts should not discourage EBM by
conclusively tying the standard of care to custom or to a CPG. Doing so has
potential to retard medical progress, and thereby deprive society of improved
medical care. At the same time, courts must be careful not to impose too great
of a burden on physicians to do research. Doing so could compromise patient
care rather than improve it. To balance these competing interests, this Note has
suggested five possible frameworks for altering the standard of care in light of
EBM. In the short-term, the easiest and most prudent approach is to diminish
reliance on custom by moving toward a modified-custom or modified-CPG
standard. In the long-term, courts should consider a bifurcated standard.
314. Noah, supra note 10, at 374.
315. As the introduction to a recent article in Trial states, "If You Don't Know What
Evidence-Based Medicine is, Read On. Chances are it will soon play a part in one of your
cases." J. Douglas Peters, Evidence-Based Medicine in Court, TRIAL 74 (Jul. 2002).

